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作者：DUFFY, J
摘要：This paper examines disequilibrium adaptive learning behavior in an overlapping generations model with fiat money. Agents are concerned with forming correct forecasts of future inflation. If they use a disequilibrium, adaptive forecast rule, it is shown that they will eventually learn to believe in a nonstationary, nonunique perfect foresight equilibrium. The nonstationary equilibrium isolated by the adaptive learning process can be used to explain the sluggish adjustment of the price level to...
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作者：BENHABIB, J; FARMER, REA
摘要：We investigate properties of the one-sector growth model with increasing returns under two organizational structures capable of reconciling the existence of aggregate increasing returns with competitive behavior by firms. The first involves input externalities; the second involves monopolistic competition. We show, for parameters in close accord with recent literature on real business cycles, that the model displays an indeterminate steady state that can be exploited to generate a model of bus...
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作者：FARMER, REA; GUO, JT
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Riverside
摘要：We calibrate a quantitative equilibrium macroeconomic model with an aggregate technology that is subject to increasing returns and show that this model may display fluctuations at business cycle frequencies even when there are no shocks to the fundamentals of the economy. These fluctuations are due to the self-fulfilling beliefs of investors which we call ''animal spirits.'' We compare the impulse response functions predicted by our model and by two other more standard models with a four-varia...
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作者：MCAFEE, RP
摘要：In a generalization of the Butters advertising model, the equilibrium involves one firm that advertises at least twice as much as the others, who all advertise equally. A cartel formation game is considered, and any equilibrium cartel involves at least two, but generally not all, firms. In one equilibrium, only the largest firms join the cartel. A merger game is considered. and, in equilibrium, the large film buys the other films in sequence, with discounting equalizing the expected utility of...
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作者：RABIN, M
摘要：A model is presented where players communicate prior to the play of a two-player, complete-information game. Each of two common hypotheses is examined: That communication yields Nash-equilibrium outcomes, and that, within the equilibrium framework, communication yields Pareto-efficient equilibria. The strong version of each of these hypotheses is rejected but weaker results are established. The main result is that, if we assume equilibrium and that players communicate for a long time, then in ...
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作者：GLAZER, J
作者单位：Tel Aviv University
摘要：When rival firms issue long-term debt, their product market behavior is driven by strategic considerations that would not be present if the firms had no debt or if their debt was short term. It is shown that with limited liability, a firm's behavior in product market competition can be strongly affected by its accumulated profits. In markets where firms choose output in every period, the higher is the firm's profit in a given period, the less aggressive it will be in the subsequent periods. Th...
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作者：MAILATH, GJ; SAMUELSON, L; SWINKELS, JM
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; Northwestern University
摘要：Normal form information sets capture situations in which players can make certain decisions as if they knew their opponents had chosen from a particular subset of their strategies. In this paper, we say that an extensive form game represents a normal form game if, for each such situation, the corresponding choice in the extensive form is made with the player knowing that the opponents have chosen from the relevant subset. We develop an algorithm that generates a representation whenever one exi...
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作者：PETERS, M
摘要：In a non-stationary matching problem sellers can compete for potential trading partners by making ex ante pprice offers publicly before the matching process occurs in each period. This paper introduces the concept of an incentive-consistent matching technology in which buyers have no incentive to modify the allocation generated by the matching technology when there is a price deviation. It is shown that when the matching technology is incentive-consistent all trades must occur at prices close ...
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作者：CHEW, SH; KARNI, E
作者单位：Johns Hopkins University
摘要：In this paper we establish the equivalence of act-independence and commutativity and the equivalence of comonotonic act-independence and comonotonic commutativity under mild conditions. As a result, using a theorem of Nakamura, we obtain an axiomatization of subjective expected utility and Choquet expected utility with a finite state space based on act-independence and comonotonic act-independence, respectively.
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作者：MORENO, D; WALKER, M
摘要：We show that Ljung's projection algorithms, which have recently been used by economists to establish convergence to rational expectations equilibrium, do not seem to apply to learning or forecasting behavior that one would normally call ''decentralized.'' If the algorithm is defined in a way that allows individuals to have differing information, then Ljung's theorem does not apply. And even if a similar theorem could be proved that would allow for differing information, there remains a Lyapuno...
