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作者：DEMANGE, G; LAROQUE, G
作者单位：Institut Polytechnique de Paris; ENSAE Paris
摘要：In a static exchange economy where the traders' initial endowments are risky, the optimality of the financial structure is studied when markets are incomplete. Only financial structures with the same number of assets are compared. A market structure is optimal, when, in a particular economy, it yields an allocation of risks which cannot be Pareto-dominated through the implementation of any other market structure. In a linear Gaussian setup, the optimal market structures are shown to span an ei...
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作者：LUO, GY
摘要：Profit maximization is the usual prerequisite for achievement of a perfectly competitive equilibrium. However, for a long time it has been thought that this principle of profit maximization can be replaced by natural selection. In an evolutionary model of an industry, where firms' outputs are chosen randomly, where entry occurs with no motivation, and where exit occurs when a firm's wealth becomes negative, this paper shows that the industry converges in probability to a perfectly competitive ...
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作者：BENCIVENGA, VR; SMITH, BD; STARR, RM
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis; University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：Hicks (''A Theory of Economic History,'' Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1969) argues that an important aspect of industrial development is the adoption of technologies requiring highly illiquid capital investments. The adoption of such technologies becomes economically viable in the presence of low-cost financial markets that provide liquidity to investors. This observation provides a mechanism by which the costs of transacting in financial markets affect the equilibrium choice of technology, produc...
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作者：WEYMARK, JA
摘要：This article provides an alternative proof of Ben Porath and Gilboa's (J. Econ. Theory 64 (1994), 443-467) characterization theorem for the class of Generalized Gini equality indices for the pure distribution problem. (C) 1995 Academic Press, Inc.
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作者：DUTTA, PK
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; University of Rochester
摘要：This paper investigates the following claims: in a dynamic game, (i) Pareto-optimal outcomes are sustainable only by patient players and (ii) the set of equilibrium outcomes expands in the discount factor. The intuition for these results, although immediate for purely repeated games, is shown to be incomplete for dynamic games. Consequently, there is no direct link between patience and the sustainability of Pareto-optimal outcomes. In fact, there are dynamic games arbitrarily ''close'' to a re...
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作者：EDLIN, AS; EPELBAUM, M
作者单位：Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico
摘要：We ask when firms with increasing returns can cover their costs independently by charging two-part tariffs (TPTs), a condition we call independent viability. To answer, we develop notions of substitutability and complementarity that account for the total value of goods and use them to find the maximum extractable surplus. We then show that independent viability is a sufficient condition for existence of a general equilibrium in which regulated natural monopolies use TPTs. Independent viability...
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作者：Baliga, S; Serrano, R
作者单位：Brown University
摘要：We study a multilateral procedure in which responders are told only their own shares. The proposal becomes common knowledge after the response stags and responders have optimistic beliefs after off-equilibrium offers. When discounting is high, the set of equilibrium agreements is a singleton; when it is low. there is a large multiplicity of equilibrium payoffs. In contrast to earlier work, our multiple equilibria are constructed by using strategy profiles in which a responder rejects any offer...
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作者：BOYLAN, RT
摘要：Biologists and economists have analyzed populations in which each individual interacts with randomly selected individuals. Because random matching generates a very complicated stochastic process, biologists and economists frequently approximate the population dynamics by a deterministic process. This paper examines the limit of random matching schemes as the population grows, matches occur very frequently, and the proportion of the population paired in a matching becomes very small. In the lim...
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作者：DUFFIE, D; RAHI, R
作者单位：University of London; Birkbeck University London
摘要：The article describes, in the context of theory and practice, this special issue of the Journal of Economic Theory on financial market innovation and security design. The main focus is on security design in incomplete financial markets, possibly with asymmetrically informed traders. We first survey the general equilibrium literature, which emphasizes the spanning role of securities. We then provide a unified framework encompassing the literature that employs a CARA-Gaussian setting to study th...
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作者：SERRANO, R
摘要：I present a mechanism whose subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes coincide with the core of an underlying convex TU game. The mechanism resembles an asset market, in which one of the players is randomly selected as a broker who centralizes trade. In addition, the rules of the mechanism are independent of the coalitional function. Therefore, the mechanism is useful for an incompletely informed designer who wishes to implement the core of these games. The mechanism is inspired by the reduced game...
