IDEAL STRUCTURES OF PATH-INDEPENDENT CHOICE FUNCTIONS
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
JOHNSON, MR
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1995.1017
发表日期：
1995
页码：
468-504
关键词：
摘要：
Ideals are used to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for classes of semigroups to be associated with classes of choice functions satisfying the Strong Axiom of Preference, the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference, or Path Independence. Semigroups whose choice functions are not path indpendent are demonstrated to lack proper ideal structures. A subsemigroup which is a monoid is identified. A motivation for interest in these structures is that the semigroup property is required of all finite state automata. Search-process foundations to choice functions facilitate applying automata results to economics and direct tests of whether an automaton is economic. (C) 1995 Academic Press, Inc.