JAMMING A RIVALS LEARNING
成果类型：
Note
署名作者：
CREANE, A
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1995.1022
发表日期：
1995
页码：
585-599
关键词：
摘要：
Can a firm (F) cause a rival (R) to learn less about R? Does F care? I explore F's ability and incentive to affect, or ''jam,'' R's private learning about R. The model developed does not have unobserved actions or ex ante asymmetric information which previous jamming models require. I find that F wants R not to learn and the more uncertain F believes R is, the more F wants to jam R's learning. Entry deterrence increases with an entrant's uncertainty, causing R to want F to believe that R is more certain about R's beliefs than R really is. (C) 1995 Academic Press, Inc.