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作者：DETEMPLE, J; MURTHY, S
作者单位：Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick; Rutgers University Newark
摘要：We examine the behaviour of the interest rate, asset prices, and asset holdings in an economy with heterogeneous, rationally updated beliefs about the expected rate of production growth. The equilibrium interest rate is a weighted average of the interest rates that would prevail in economies populated by homogeneous agents with the beliefs of the respective agents in the heterogeneous model. The weights are given by the fractions of total wealth held. Financial innovation affects the dynamics ...
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作者：LUENBERGER, DG
摘要：Consider an economy with d commodities and n individuals. A pair (p, M), where p is a price vector and M = (m1, m2, ..., m(n)) is a set of n individual income levels, defines a set of individual budget constraints. It is known that such pairs provide a framework for duality-based investigations of Pareto efficient allocations and of equilibria. This paper employs this framework in a general setting, not requiring smoothness or boundedness of budget sets, to develop duals of the first and secon...
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作者：NEILSON, WS
摘要：Expected utility maximizers bid according to dominant strategies in second price auctions for risky prizes, bids are independent of the number of other bidders or the reserve price. the optimal reserve price is independent of the number of bidders, and ascending bid and second price auctions generate the same expected revenue. If expected utility fails, none of these results remain true, and symmetric equilibria may not be unique. If fanning in and betweenness hold, uniquenes is restored, bids...
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作者：STAHL, DO
摘要：N sellers advertise a homogeneous good to M buyers whose only source of information is this advertising. There is a unique Nash Equilibrium (NE) in which sellers choose a common advertising level and mix over prices. This NE approaches marginal cost priing as advertising costs decrease, and approaches monopoly pricing as advertising costs increase. More sellers induce lower prices and less advertising per seller; however, the social welfare effect can be negative for some advertising technolog...
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作者：TIAN, GQ; LI, Q
作者单位：Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington
摘要：In this paper, we formalize an implementable state-ownership institutional framework for public goods economies by using the Generalized Ratio equilibrium that yields Pareto-efficient and individually rational allocations and that allows for general variable returns. We then address the problems created by manipulative behavior on the part of individuals and study the implementability of this social choice rule by giving an incentive compatible and well-behaved mechanism whose Nash allocations...
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作者：PETERS, H; WAKKER, P
作者单位：Leiden University; Leiden University - Excl LUMC
摘要：The only examples available in the literature to show that the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference does not imply the Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference, the examples of Gale and Shafer, apply only to the case of three commodities. This paper constructs examples for four or more commodities. (C) 1994 Academic Press, Inc.
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作者：BORDER, KC; SEGAL, U
作者单位：University of Toronto
摘要：Machina has proposed a definition of dynamic consistency which admits non-expected utility functionals. We show that even under this new definition a dynamically consistent preference relation that is differentiable becomes arbitrarily close to an expected utility preference after the realization of a low probability event. (C) 1994 Academic Press, Inc.
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作者：FUDENBERG, D; LEVINE, DK
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：We present a general algorithm for computing the limit, as delta --> 1, of the set of payoffs of perfect public equilibria of repeated games with long-run and short-run players, allowing for the possibility that the players' actions are not observable by their opponents. We illustrate the algorithm with two economic examples. In a simple partnership we show how to compute the equilibrium payoffs when the folk theorem fails. In an investment game, we show that two competing capitalists subject ...
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作者：BLUME, A
摘要：This paper examines the effectiveness of perturbation refinements in sender-receiver games. It is shown that babbling equilibria are always perfect and even proper. However, they need not be strategically stable. An example is given where the only strategically stable pooling equilibria are pure strategy equilibria. Furthermore, there exist examples in which none of the pooling equilibria is strategically stable. Persistence is effective in games with small message spaces. It rules out pooling...
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作者：KAJII, A
摘要：We study the optimality, or efficiency, of competitive equilibria in a standard two period economy where markets are incomplete. Statistical information about consumers' preferences and endowments is known to a social planner, but the planner cannot observe consumers' types directly. A competitive equilibrium is anonymous constrained optimal if the social planner cannot Pareto improve upon the equilibrium allocation by intervening in asset markets with any asset trade rule satisfying anonymity...
