PRIVATE INFORMATION AND THE DESIGN OF SECURITIES
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
DEMANGE, G; LAROQUE, G
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1995.1009
发表日期：
1995
页码：
233-257
关键词：
摘要：
The privileged information that the owners have on their firms may discourage rational financial investors and consequently may prevent the entrepreneurs from floating their company on the market. The paper studies the validity of this argument in a model similar to that of Grossman and Stiglitz [8]: an entrepeneur who contemplates issuing a new security faces a trade-off between speculative gains, which arise from his privileged information, and an insurance motive, associated with the insurance provided by the stock market. We make explicit how this tradeoff depends on the fundamentals of the economy: aggregate risk, risk tolerance, precision of the privileged information. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Codes: D82, G14. (C) 1995 Academic Press, Inc.