STRATEGIC INFORMATION MANIPULATION IN DUOPOLIES

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: MIRMAN, LJ; SAMUELSON, L; SCHLEE, EE
• 署名单位: University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1994.1020
• 发表日期: 1994
• 页码: 363-384

摘要

This paper studies a duopoly market in which firms can draw inferences concerning (uncertain) market demand from observations of their outputs and market price. Firms may adjust their outputs away from myopically optimal levels to affect the informativeness of the market price. Because firms' quantities are observed, firms can manipulate the extent to which belief revision occurs rather than the direction in which beliefs are revised (as in signal-jamming models). We develop conditions and present examples under which the value of information is positive and negative and under which firms will increase or decrease quantity to manipulate information.