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作者：BLUME, A; SOBEL, J
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：We define communication-proof equilibria in simple games of communication. These equilibria satisfy a stability condition guaranteeing that they would not be affected if new opportunities to communicate arose. We look for partitions of possible equilibria into sets of good and bad equilibria. The good equilibria are those that cannot be destabilized by another good equilibrium. The remaining equilibria are bad. An equilibrium for the original game is communication proof if its is a good equili...
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作者：ARYA, A; GLOVER, J
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University
摘要：This paper studies a multiagent moral hazard setting. We resolve the tacit collusion problem that arises in our setting while employing a solution concept that makes less demanding behavioral assumptions than Nash. A simple mechanism is constructed that approximately implements the second-best solution in two rounds of iteratively removing strictly dominated strategies. Under our mechanism, the agents' best-reply correspondences are well defined, a small message space is employed, and the mess...
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作者：Hellwig, MF
作者单位：Harvard University
摘要：The paper gives necessary and sufficient conditions for an expected-utility-maximizing decision maker to prefer any compound Sigma(i)(n)=1 <(X)over tilde(i)> of n independent, identically distributed random variables over any other such compound Sigma(i)(n)=1 <(Y)over tilde(i)> with E<(Y)over tilde(i)> < E<(X)over tilde(i)>, provided that n is sufficiently large. A sufficient condition is that absolute risk aversion go to zero as the decision maker's wealth becomes unboundedly positive or nega...
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作者：Serizawa, S
摘要：We study the preference domain where voting by committees of Barbera et nl. (S. Barbera, H. Sonnenschein, and L. Zhou, Voting by committees, Econometrica 59 (1991), 595-609) is strategy-proof in an extended model. ''Cross-shaped'' preference is a generalization of separable preference of Barbera et al. We show that if a scheme of voting by committees without a dummy voter is strategy-proof on some rich domain, then any preference of a voter is cross-shaped on some set. The width of such set de...
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作者：BERTOCCHI, G; WANG, Y
作者单位：Universita di Modena e Reggio Emilia; Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University
摘要：We study an overlapping generations model where the level of confidence in money evolves endogenously as a function of aggregate real money balances. The economy can display multiple stationary equilibria where the aggregate bubble on money is stochastic and the level of confidence is partial. Steady states can be ranked by the degree of confidence, with more inefficiency being associated with less confidence. It is only under certain restrictions that the Golden Rule constitutes a steady stat...
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作者：TSUI, KY
摘要：This paper generalizes the relative and absolute inequality measures pioneered by Atkinson, Kolm, and Sen to the multidimensional setting with K attributes of well being. Social evaluation functions satisfying a set of axioms which are natural generalizations of their counterparts in the unidimensional context are first introduced. Then it is shown that different scale invariance axioms inexorably lead to classes of relative and absolute inequality indices. (C) 1995 Academic Press, Inc.
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作者：TENRAA, T
摘要：The substitution theorem states that an economy with many commodities but only one factor input (say labor) will net substitute inputs (commodities or labor) when final demand changes. This Note drops the assumption that all activities require some labor input and constructs the dominant technology. (C) 1995 Academic Press, Inc.
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作者：SILEO, PW
摘要：A model is developed which represents an agent's imperfect access to his true preferences via a ''sensation of preference'' function. The resulting structure, which is mathematically related to stochastic preferences, implies commonly observed intransitivities of indifference while maintaining the property of strong monotonicity. Properties of the agent's perceived preference relation and the implications for trading behavior are explored. Consistent with experimental and survey data, and unli...
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作者：ESTEBAN, J; MITRA, T; RAY, D
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作者：PESENDORFER, W
摘要：We develop a model of financial innovation, in which intermediaries can issue new financial securities against collateral in the form of standard securities. Intermediaries have to market their innovations and marketing is costly. We show that the equilibrium asset structure may exhibit redundancies as frequently observed on financial markets. We give conditions for efficiency of financial innovation and show that with small innovation costs the indeterminacy of equilibrium allocations has sma...
