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作者：GOLLIER, C
摘要：In this paper, we consider the problem of determining the conditions under which a change in risk increases the optimal value of a decision variable for all risk-averse agents. For a large class of payoff functions, we obtain the least constraining (necessary and sufficient) condition on the change in risk for signing its effect without any additional restriction on the utility function than risk aversion. It entails all existing sufficient conditions as particular cases. Our results are appli...
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作者：GOVINDAN, S
作者单位：Western University (University of Western Ontario)
摘要：For the Kreps and Wilson version of Selten's Chain Store Game, every equilibrium of every stable set induces the same outcome. This unique outcome is that induced by the Kreps and Wilson solution. (C) 1995 Academic Press, Inc.
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作者：LAGUNOFF, RD
摘要：In decision problems where agents hold private information, an uninformed central planner may be unable to identify Pareto improvements that each agent himself could identify. We examine allocation rules in a simple bilateral bargaining problem which are ''resilient'' in the sense that no improvements could be both identified and collectively achieved when the traders themselves can bargain over the mechanism. Specifically, recursively resilient rules are status quo, sequential equilibrium out...
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作者：KNOBLAUCH, V
摘要：Every symmetric, constant-sum, two-person game with strategy set [0, 1] and payoff functions that are continuous off the diagonal is a location game. Location game versions can therefore be used to analyze games not usually thought of in geometric terms. By way of illustration, a location game version is used to provide geometric insights into a Cournot duopoly game. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C72. (C) 1995 Academic Press, Inc.
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作者：MA, BK; WEISS, JH
摘要：Under the assumption that preferences can be represented by linear-in-parameters utility functions, Caplin and Nalebuff (Econometrica 59 (1991), 1-23) have demonstrated that in a super-majority voting problem, the mean voter's choice is unbeatable according to a rule that depends on the distribution and dimensionality of voters' preferences. We show in some cases that the mean voter and the social choice, as well as this rule, are not invariant with respect to transformations of the parameters...
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作者：KANDORI, M; ROB, R
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania
摘要：We extend the evolutionary process studied in Kandori er al., Econometrica 61 (1993), 29-56, to n x n games. The evolutionary process is driven by two forces: players switching to the best response against the present strategy configuration, and players experimenting with new strategies. We show that a unique behavior pattern, called the long-run equilibrium, arises even if the underlying game has multiple (static) equilibria. The paper gives a general algorithm for computing the LRE, and then...
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作者：Topkis, DM
摘要：Complementarities arise naturally in diverse models of optimal decision-making in a firm. Theoretical properties of supermodular functions provide a powerful tool for analyzing qualitative properties in such circumstances. This paper considers a general model of the firm and gives sufficient conditions for complementarities to hold and for optimal decisions to be monotone with a parameter. A variety of specific models of the firm are shown to satisfy these conditions. Necessary conditions deli...
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作者：VIVES, X
摘要：The paper studies the rate at which dispersed private information about the value a of a risky financial asset is incorporated into prices in an information adjustment mechanism. The mechanism, in the presence of competitive market makers, aggregates the information of risk averse agents at a rate of n(-1/2), where n is the number of rounds of the adjustment process. Without market makers, convergence of prices to v is much slower. In any case the asymptotic precision of prices is negatively r...
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作者：MONGIN, P
摘要：We investigate the aggregation of first nonatomic probabilities and second Savagean orderings, subject to the following consistency constraints: (i) the aggregate is a subjective probability or a Savagean ordering, respectively; and (ii) it satisfies the Pareto principle. Aggregation is viewed here as a single-profile exercise. We show that affine rules are the only solutions to the problem of aggregating nonatomic probabilities. Assuming weak Pareto conditions and technical restrictions, we s...
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作者：CONLON, JR
摘要：A shorter and more intuitive proof is given of Dekel's implicit expected utility representation of a preference ordering satisfying the betweenness property. (C) 1995 Academic Press, Inc.
