Double implementation by a simple game form in the commons problem
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Shin, SW; Suh, SC
署名单位：
University of Windsor
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1997.2321
发表日期：
1997
页码：
205-213
关键词：
摘要：
We explore the possibility of constructing desirable game forms that doubly implement solutions in the commons problem. For thr desirability of a game form, we require that the game form satisfy several properties such as voluntary participation. quantity announcements, forthrightness, nonwastefulness, and best response property. Then we identify a class of solutions which are doubly implementable by such game forms. (C) 1997 Academic Press.