A dynamic model of equilibrium selection in signaling markets
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Noldeke, G; Samuelson, L
署名单位：
University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1996.2239
发表日期：
1997
页码：
118-156
关键词：
摘要：
In his work on signaling, Spence proposed a dynamic model of a market in which a buyer revises prices in light of experience and in which sellers. with private information about their types, choose utility-maximizing signals given these prices. We follow Spence's suggestion of introducing perturbations into the resulting dynamic process. In a broad class of markets, our model selects a separating equilibrium outcome if and only if the equilibrium outcome satisfies a version of the undefeated equilibrium concept, whereas a pooling equilibrium outcome is selected if and only if the equilibrium outcome is both undefeated and satisfies D1. (C) 1997 Academic Press.