Prisoners' dilemma in duopoly (super) games
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Lambertini, L
署名单位：
University of Copenhagen
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1997.2328
发表日期：
1997
页码：
181-191
关键词：
摘要：
The choice between quantity and price in order to stabilize collusion is modeled here. It is shown that this relocates the prisoners' dilemma backward, From the market stage to the stage where the market variable is chosen in order to sustain collusion. and where discount rates appear as the payoffs. Likewise, a prisoners dilemma arises also when both the market variable and the type of behavior (cooperative or non-cooperative) are simultaneously chosen. (C) 1997 Academic Press.