When are nonanonymous players negligible?
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Fudenberg, D; Levine, D; Pesendorfer, W
署名单位：
Harvard University; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Princeton University
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1997.2373
发表日期：
1998
页码：
46-71
关键词：
摘要：
We examine games played by a single large player and a large number of opponents who are small, but not anonymous. if the Flay of the small players is observed with noise, and if the number of actions the large player controls is bounded as the number of small players grows, the equilibrium set converges to that of the grime where there is a continuum of small players. This paper extends previous work on the negligibility of small players by dropping the assumption that small players' actions are anonymous. That is, we allow each small player's actions to be observed separately, instead of supposing that the small players' actions are only observed through their effect on an aggregate statistic. (C) 1998 Academic Press.