Payoff continuity in incomplete information games
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Kajii, A; Morris, S
署名单位：
University of Tsukuba; University of Pennsylvania
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1998.2418
发表日期：
1998
页码：
267-276
关键词：
摘要：
An incomplete information game is defined by a probability distribution mu over a type space and payoff functions u. Probability distribution mu' is strategically close to mu if, for any bounded payoff functions u and any equilibrium of the game (mu, u), there exists an approximate equilibrium of the game (mu', u) under which all players get approximately the same payoffs. This note shows that two probability distributions are strategically close if and only if (1) they assign similar ex ante probability to all events; and (2) with high ex ante probability, it is approximate common knowledge that they assign similar conditional probabilities to all events. (C) 1998 Academic Press.