A learning approach to auctions
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Hon-Snir, S; Monderer, D; Sela, A
署名单位：
Technion Israel Institute of Technology; University of Mannheim
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1998.2419
发表日期：
1998
页码：
65-88
关键词：
摘要：
We analyze a repeated first-price auction in which the types of the players are determined before the first round. It is proved that if every player is using either a belief-based learning scheme with bounded recall or a generalized fictitious play learning scheme, then after sufficiently long time, the players' bids are in equilibrium in the one-shot auction in which the types are commonly known. (C) 1998 Academic Press.