A dynamic equilibrium model of search, bargaining, and money
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Coles, MG; Wright, R
署名单位：
University of Essex; Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE); University of Pennsylvania
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1997.2353
发表日期：
1998
页码：
32-54
关键词：
摘要：
This paper considers dynamic equilibria in a model with random matching. strategic bargaining, and money. Equilibrium in the bargaining game is characterized in terms of a simple differential equation. When we embed this characterization into the monetary economy, the model can generate outcomes such as limit cycles that never arise if one imposes a myopic Nash bargaining solution, as has been done in the past. (C) 1998 Academic Press.