Cournot-Nash and Lindahl equilibria in pure public good economies
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Shitovitz, B; Spiegel, M
署名单位：
University of Haifa
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1997.2449
发表日期：
1998
页码：
1-18
关键词：
摘要：
In this paper, we derive qualitative and asymptotic results on Cournot-Nash and Lindahl equilibria in pure public good economies. In a discrete finite economy with similar consumers (e.g., sharing the same Cobb-Douglas utility), we show that the consumer with the biggest initial endowment prefers the proportional Lindahl over his Cournot-Nash bundle. The asymptotic results are derived using a model of a mixed economy with an atomless sector of consumers as an idealization for economies with few influential players and many very small consumers. Conditions which ensure that all consumers prefer the Pareto-efficient Lindahl allocation over the nan-cooperative Cournot-Nash allocation were specified. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D50, D60, H41. (C) 1998 Academic Press.