Coordination in auctions with entry
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Campbell, CM
署名单位：
University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1995.2452
发表日期：
1998
页码：
425-450
关键词：
摘要：
We examine self-enforcing bidder coordination in auctions in which bidding is costly. Conditions on the distribution of valuations are identified that guarantee multiple equilibria. Under slightly stronger conditions, within the set of sunspot payoffs only those that are convex combinations of payoffs of extreme asymmetric equilibria are interim efficient for the bidders. If preplay communication is possible, every no-communication equilibrium payoff is interim Pareto-dominated for the bidders by some cheap-talk equilibrium payoff. When the number of auctions is large, communication equilibria exist that yield ex-post efficient payoffs for the bidders almost surely. (C) 1998 Academic Press.
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