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作者：Sano, Ryuji
作者单位：Yokohama National University
摘要：This study examines auctions in which the value of goods is endogenously determined by ex post in-vestment while bidders face financial constraints. The main results are twofold. First, we characterize performance comparisons on revenue and investment between standard auctions. When the valuation is linear in investment, we have the equivalence theorem with respect to the seller's expected revenue and the winner's expected investment. When the valuation is concave in investment, the first-pric...
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作者：Akyol, Ethem
作者单位：TOBB Ekonomi ve Teknoloji University
摘要：We study the problem of allocating n objects to n agents without monetary transfers in a setting where each agent's preference over objects is private. We assume that each agent's value vector (values for n objects) is independently drawn from an exchangeable distribution and show that the celebrated Random Serial Dictatorship mechanism is welfare inferior to another allocation method, the Random Boston mechanism, when the number of agents and objects is large. Specifically, every type of ever...
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作者：Weng, Xi; Wu, Fan; Yin, Xundong
作者单位：Peking University; California Institute of Technology; Central University of Finance & Economics
摘要：We study signaling games with quadratic payoffs. As signaling games admit multiple separating equilibria, many equilibrium selection rules are proposed and a well-known solution is Riley equilibria. They are separating equilibria in which the sender achieves the highest equilibrium payoff for all types among all separating equilibria. We analyze the conditions for Riley equilibria to be linear, a common assumption in many applications. We derive a sufficient and necessary condition for the exi...
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作者：Jehiel, Philippe; Samuelson, Larry
作者单位：University of London; University of London Institute in Paris; Yale University
摘要：We offer an approach to cooperation in repeated games of private monitoring in which players construct models of their opponents' behavior by observing the frequencies of play in a record of past plays of the game in which actions but not signals are recorded. Players construct models of their opponent's behavior by grouping the histories in the record into a relatively small number of analogy classes for which they estimate probabilities of cooperation. The incomplete record and the limited n...
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作者：Carnehl, Christoph; Fukuda, Satoshi; Kos, Nenad
作者单位：Bocconi University; Bocconi University; Bocconi University; Bocconi University
摘要：We study social distancing in an epidemiological model. Distancing reduces the individual's probability of getting infected but comes at a cost. Equilibrium distancing flattens the curve and decreases the final size of the epidemic. We examine the effects of distancing on the outset, the peak, and the final size of the epidemic. First, the prevalence increases beyond the initial value only if the transmission rate is in the intermediate region. Second, the peak of the epidemic is non-monotonic...
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作者：Apesteguia, Jose; Ballester, Miguel A.
作者单位：ICREA; Pompeu Fabra University; University of Oxford
摘要：Random utility models in which heterogeneity of preferences is modeled by means of an ordered collec-tion of utilities, or types, provide a powerful framework for understanding a variety of economic behaviors. This paper studies the micro-foundations of ordered random utility models with the objective of meeting empirical requirements. This is done by working with arbitrary collections of ordered menus of alterna-tives, and by making no parametric assumptions about the type distribution. The m...
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作者：Li, Kai; Liu, Jun
作者单位：Southwestern University of Finance & Economics - China; Macquarie University; University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：This paper studies implications of return extrapolation in a consumption-based asset pricing model. We show that return extrapolation has strong implications for the pricing kernel. The time variation in the agen-t's return expectations is mainly reflected in the short rate and little in return volatility and equity premium. Return extrapolation causes return volatility and equity premium to be lower than the rational counter-parts. In addition to the risk premium, the equity premium can inclu...
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作者：Baccara, Mariagiovanna; Lee, SangMok; Yariv, Leeat
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL); Washington University (WUSTL); Princeton University
摘要：We study dynamic task allocation when providers' expertise evolves endogenously through training. We characterize optimal assignment protocols and compare them to discretionary procedures, where it is the clients who select their service providers. Our results indicate that welfare gains from centralization are greater when tasks arrive more rapidly, and when training technologies improve. Monitoring seniors' backlog of clients always increases welfare but may decrease training. Methodological...
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作者：Kambhampati, Ashwin
作者单位：United States Department of Defense; United States Navy; United States Naval Academy
摘要：A principal contracts with an agent, who takes a hidden action. The principal does not know all of the actions the agent can take and evaluates her payoff from any contract according to its worst-case performance. Carroll (2015) showed that there exists a linear contract that is optimal within the class of deterministic contracts. This paper shows that, whenever there is an optimal linear contract with non-zero slope, the principal can strictly increase her payoff by randomizing over determini...
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作者：Wu, Wenhao
作者单位：ShanghaiTech University
摘要：I study a Bayesian persuasion model in which multiple senders sequentially persuade one receiver, after observing signal structures of prior senders and their realizations. I develop a geometric method, recursive concavification , to characterize the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium paths. I prove the existence of the silent equilibrium , where at most one sender provides nontrivial information. I also show that when there are only two senders and the receiver has a finite action space, it is gene...
