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作者：Hartmann, Lorenz
作者单位：University of Basel
摘要：Preferences over acts have an alpha-Maxmin Expected Utility (alpha-MEU) representation if they can be repre-sented by the alpha-mixture of the worst and the best expected utility over a set of priors. The case alpha = 1 is the Maxmin Expected Utility (MEU) model characterized in Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989).This paper provides the first axiomatic characterization of the alpha-MEU model in the Anscombe-Aumann framework for all alpha is an element of [0, 1]\I21l. My first axiom is a weakening of...
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作者：Billand, Pascal; Bravard, Christophe; Joshi, Sumit; Mahmud, Ahmed Saber; Sarangi, Sudipta
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Ecole Normale Superieure de Lyon (ENS de LYON); Universite Claude Bernard Lyon 1; Universite Jean Monnet; Universite Lyon 2; Communaute Universite Grenoble Alpes; Universite Grenoble Alpes (UGA); George Washington University; Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University
摘要：We study the formation of multilayer networks where payoffs are determined by the degrees of players in each network. We begin by imposing either concavity or convexity in degree on the payoff function of the players. We then explore distinct network relationships that result from inter- and intra-network spillovers captured by the properties of supermodularity/submodularity and strategic complementarity respectively. We show the existence of equilibria and characterize them. Additionally, we ...
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作者：Tang, Rui; Zhang, Mu
作者单位：Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：We study a decision maker's ex-ante choices over menus. The decision maker has in mind a set of pos-sible future preferences that can be justified, for instance, by her past behavior, and she naively evaluates each menu according to the best option in the menu among those that can be rationalized by her future preferences. We provide a characterization for this menu preference, discuss the uniqueness of its represen-tation, and propose a comparative measure of the decision maker's naivete. We ...
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作者：Koenig-Kersting, Christian; Kops, Christopher; Trautmann, Stefan T.
作者单位：University of Innsbruck; Maastricht University; Ruprecht Karls University Heidelberg; Tilburg University
摘要：We provide a test of the axioms of certainty and weak certainty independence in models of decision -making under subjective uncertainty. We show that it is through these two weakenings of the classic independence axiom that prominent ambiguity models retain properties that stand in conflict with the ambiguity-sensitive behavior that is revealed in our experiment. Our findings suggest that this conflict may be of a more fundamental nature than what most of these models can accommodate. Our resu...
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作者：Roy, Nilanjan
作者单位：City University of Hong Kong
摘要：We design an experiment to study the implications of allowing players to revise their actions in a Cournot duopoly game. Payoffs are determined only by the quantities selected at the end in a real-time revision game. On the other hand, in a stochastic revision game, opportunities to adjust quantities arrive randomly, and the quantities selected at the last revision opportunity are implemented. Contrasting results emerge: while real-time revision results in choices that are more competitive tha...
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作者：Matyskova, Ludmila; Montes, Alfonso
作者单位：Universitat d'Alacant; Universidad de Chile; Universitat d'Alacant; Universidad de Chile
摘要：We consider a Bayesian persuasion model, in which the receiver can gather independent information about the state at a uniformly posterior-separable cost. We show that the sender provides information that prevents the receiver from gathering independent information in equilibrium. When the receiver faces a lower cost of information, her 'threat' of gathering independent information increases, thus decreasing the sender's power to persuade. Lower cost of information can also hurt the receiver, ...
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作者：Chen, Jun; Elliott, Matthew; Koh, Andrew
作者单位：Renmin University of China; University of Cambridge; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：The past twenty years have witnessed the emergence of internet conglomerates fueled by acquisitions. We build a simple model of network formation to study this. Following the resource-based view of competitive advantage from the management literature we endow firms with capabilities which drive their competitive-ness across markets. Firms can merge to combine their capabilities, spin-off new firms by partitioning their capabilities, or procure unassigned capabilities. We study stable industry ...
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作者：Meisner, Vincent; von Wangenheim, Jonas
作者单位：Technical University of Berlin; University of Bonn
摘要：Evidence suggests that participants in strategy-proof matching mechanisms play dominated strategies. To explain the data, we introduce expectation-based loss aversion into a school-choice setting and characterize choice-acclimating personal equilibria. We find that non-truthful preference submissions can be strictly optimal if and only if they are top-rank monotone. In equilibrium, inefficiency or justified envy may arise in seemingly stable or efficient mechanisms. Specifically, students who ...
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作者：Lou, Youcheng; Rahi, Rohit
作者单位：Chinese Academy of Sciences; Academy of Mathematics & System Sciences, CAS; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：We study the market for a risky asset in which traders are heterogeneous both in terms of their value for the asset and the information that they have about this value. Traders behave strategically and use the equilibrium price to extract information that is relevant to them. Due to adverse selection, uninformed traders are less willing than the informed to provide liquidity. We evaluate the impact of a change in the size or composition of the investor population on price informativeness, liqu...
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作者：Marchiori, Carmen; Minelli, Enrico
作者单位：University of Brescia
摘要：Due to the public good nature of basic research, the mechanisms for rewarding talent are very different from those prevailing in the production of applied research by private actors. We develop a growth model in which such mechanisms are taken explicitly into account. This allows us to address the following fundamental questions: how do policies in the public research sector influence the effort and risk-taking decisions of researchers of different talent? How do these choices affect the aggre...
