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作者：Kaas, Leo
作者单位：Goethe University Frankfurt
摘要：Equilibrium models with heterogeneous agents and aggregate uncertainty are difficult to analyze since policy functions and market prices usually depend on the cross-sectional distribution over agents' state variables which is a high-dimensional object. This paper considers a general model framework in which this curse of dimensionality does not arise because equilibrium prices are determined by market entry conditions and are independent of the cross-sectional distribution (block-recursive equ...
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作者：Hiller, Victor; Wu, Jiabin; Zhang, Hanzhe
作者单位：Universite Paris-Pantheon-Assas; University of Oregon; Michigan State University
摘要：Building on previous literature that examines the influence of intergenerational transmission in cultural evolution, we highlight the importance of the marriage market in the determination of cultural homogeneity (melting pot) versus heterogeneity (diversity). To do so, we characterize cultural evolutionary processes under different distributions of marital preferences and stable matching schemes. In our setting, cultural substitutability (Bisin and Verdier, 2001) is neither sufficient nor nec...
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作者：Yang, Erya; Kopylov, Igor
作者单位：Sun Yat Sen University; University of California System; University of California Irvine
摘要：We propose a random quasi-linear utility model (RQUM) where quasi-linear utility functions are drawn randomly via some probability distribution pi, and utility ties are broken by a convenient lexicographic rule. We characterize RQUM and identify pi uniquely in terms of stochastic choice data. McFadden's (1973) additive random utility model is obtained as a special case where utility ties have a zero probability in all menus. Another distinct case of RQUM captures finite populations and derives...
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作者：Hebert, Benjamin; Woodford, Michael
作者单位：Stanford University; Columbia University
摘要：Decisions take time, and the time taken to reach a decision is likely to be informative about the cost of more precise judgments. We formalize this insight using a dynamic model of optimal evidence accumula-tion. We provide conditions under which the resulting belief dynamics resemble either diffusion processes or processes with large jumps. We then consider the in which discounting effects are small relative to the opportunity cost of time, and show that the state-contingent choice probabilit...
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作者：Parakhonyak, Alexei; Vikander, Nick
作者单位：University of Oxford; University of Oxford; University of Copenhagen
摘要：We show that a firm may benefit from strategically creating scarcity for its product, in order to trigger herding behaviour from consumers in situations where such behaviour is otherwise unlikely. We consider a setting with social learning, where consumers observe sales from previous cohorts and update beliefs about product quality before making their purchase. Imposing a capacity constraint directly limits sales but also makes information coarser for consumers, who react favourably to a sell-...
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作者：Polanski, Arnold; Vega-Redondo, Fernando
作者单位：University of East Anglia; Bocconi University; Bocconi University
摘要：We study how learning and influence co-evolve in a social network by extending the classical model of DeGroot (1974) in two fundamental ways: (a) opinions are multidimensional and the learning time-span is arbitrary; (b) the effective social network is endogenously shaped by opinion-based homophily. Our analysis starts by establishing the existence of an equilibrium where, following (a)-(b), the learning outcome and the social network are jointly determined. This is followed by its characteriz...
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作者：Banerjee, Snehal; Breon-Drish, Bradyn; Kaniel, Ron; Kremer, Ilan
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego; University of Rochester; Fudan University; Reichman University; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; University of Warwick
摘要：Why do firms engage in costly, voluntary disclosure of information which is subsumed by a later announcement? We consider a model in which the firm's manager can choose to disclose short-term information which becomes redundant later. When disclosure costs are sufficiently low, the manager discloses even if she only cares about the long-term price of the firm. Intuitively, by disclosing, she causes early investors to trade less aggressively, reducing price informativeness, which in turn increa...
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作者：Flynn, Joel P.; Sastry, Karthik A.
摘要：To study the equilibrium implications of decision frictions, we introduce a new class of control costs in continuum-player, continuum-action games in which agents interact via an aggregate of the actions of others. The costs that we study accommodate a rich class of decision frictions, including ex post misop-timization, imperfect ex ante planning, cognitive constraints that depend endogenously on the behavior of others, and consideration sets. We provide primitive conditions such that equilib...
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作者：Biswas, Sonny
作者单位：University of Bristol
摘要：I analyze a novel spillover effect from collateralized to uncollateralized loans. High-type borrowers have good projects, while low-type borrowers do not know their project quality. High-type borrowers post collateral, and a monopolist bank screens only low-type borrowers ' projects. Different from existing models, equilibrium collateral requirements are stricter than the minimum necessary to achieve separation, even if collateral is costly. When high-type borrowers post more collateral, the b...
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作者：Ma, Zizhen
作者单位：Wuhan University
摘要：This paper studies majoritarian reputational bargaining. Three agents bargain over the division of one dollar under majority rule, and proposers are randomly chosen. Each agent has private information about whether she is a rational type that maximizes her expected share of the dollar or an obstinate type that commits to claiming a certain share of the dollar. Efficiency and surplus distribution in majoritarian reputational bargaining may differ from their counterparts in bilateral reputationa...
