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作者：Zhu, Shuguang
作者单位：Shanghai University of Finance & Economics
摘要：This study examines a mechanism design problem where the principal can affect the agents' knowledge of a payoff-relevant state, namely, the principal designs and commits to an information disclosure policy that generates agent-specific private signals, while the principal directly observes neither the state nor the signal profile. We solve this problem by constructing a novel class of disclosure policies that exhibit individually uninformative, aggregately revealing, and immune to unilateral m...
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作者：Solan, Eilon; Zhao, Chang
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; University of International Business & Economics
摘要：We consider a dynamic inspection problem between a principal and several agents. The principal ob-serves the full inspection history, whereas each agent only observes inspections imposed on himself. When inspection resources are limited, the inspection intensities for agents are negatively correlated, and hence each agent cares not only about his own inspection history, but also about the inspection histories of the other agents. In such cases, should the principal publicly reveal past inspect...
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作者：Blume, Andreas; Lai, Ernest K.; Lim, Wooyoung
作者单位：University of Arizona; Lehigh University; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
摘要：We experimentally compare mediated (cheap) talk with direct (cheap) talk. Theory, guided by a char-acterization of equilibria in both environments, suggests that mediated talk has the potential to improve information sharing and welfare relative to direct talk. We sharpen the theory prediction by invoking Craw-ford's (2003) language-anchored level-k analysis. In the experiment, we find that mediated talk can indeed facilitate information transmission. We also find, however, that this requires ...
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作者：Harstad, Bard
摘要：This paper presents a novel dynamic bargaining game where every party is proposing only its own con-tribution, before all pledges must be unanimously approved. I show that, with uncertain tolerance for delay, each equilibrium pledge maximizes an asymmetric Nash product. The weights on others' payoffs increase in the uncertainty, but decrease in the correlation of the shocks. The weights vary pledge to pledge, and this implies that the outcome is generically inefficient. The Nash demand game an...
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作者：Ma, Wei
作者单位：Shandong University
摘要：Given a finite number of exponential discounting time preferences with at least two of them having distinct discount rates, Millner and Heal (2018) present a necessary and sufficient condition for their weighted utilitarian aggregation to be time consistent. We show by an example that the condition is sufficient but not necessary, and demonstrate that one possibility for making the condition necessary is to assume that all time preferences involved are associated with distinct discount rates. ...
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作者：Lester, Benjamin; Shourideh, Ali; Venkateswaran, Venky; Zetlin-Jones, Ariel
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Philadelphia; Carnegie Mellon University; New York University
摘要：We develop a dynamic model of trading through market-makers that incorporates two canonical sources of illiquidity: trading (or search) frictions, which imply that investors can rebalance their portfolio only with a delay; and information frictions, which imply that market-makers face some degree of adverse selection. We use this model to study the effects of various technological innovations and regulatory initiatives that have reduced trading frictions in over-the-counter markets. Our main r...
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作者：Pei, Harry
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：I study a repeated communication game between a patient sender and a sequence of myopic receivers. The sender has persistent private information about his cost of lying. Each period, the sender privately observes an i.i.d. state and recommends an action. The receiver takes an action after observing this recommendation and the full history of states and recommendations. I provide conditions under which a sufficiently patient sender can attain his optimal commitment payoff in the repeated game. ...
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作者：Hashimoto, Ken-ichi; Ono, Yoshiyasu; Schlegl, Matthias
作者单位：Kobe University; University of Osaka; Sophia University
摘要：In this paper, we show that underemployment and not necessarily high unemployment becomes the main measure of economic slack in the labor market under secular stagnation. Specifically, involuntary underemployment in the form of a persistent shortfall of working hours occurs in the search and matching model, provided that households derive utility from holding wealth, and quickly dominates the total employment gap under stagnation. Conventional policy measures aimed at reducing unemployment may...
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作者：Chatterji, Shurojit; Kajii, Atsushi
作者单位：Singapore Management University; Kwansei Gakuin University; Kwansei Gakuin University
摘要：Do price forecasts of rational economic agents need to coincide in intertemporal perfectly competitive complete markets in order for markets to allocate resources efficiently? To address this question, we define an efficient temporary equilibrium (ETE) within the framework of a two period economy. Although an ETE allocation is intertemporally efficient and is obtained by perfect competition, it can arise without the agents' forecasts being coordinated on a perfect foresight price. With time-se...
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作者：Ding, Sihua
作者单位：Nankai University
摘要：We study how people form networks through introductions. We consider a model where players with different ability levels are connected in a network. The players seek to match with someone they are linked to in the network (i.e., their neighbors), and they prefer high-ability neighbors over low-ability ones. We investigate whether a player will strategically introduce two unacquainted neighbors to each other to improve her own matching outcome. We find that this is possible if (i) the player ma...
