-
作者：He, Ping; Liu, Zehao; Xie, Chengbo
作者单位：Tsinghua University; Renmin University of China; Southwestern University of Finance & Economics - China
摘要：Fiscal-backed money can provide additional liquidity to consumers and mitigate the liquidity shortage problem in an economy with banks where agents face idiosyncratic liquidity shocks without being fully insured. The government issues fiat money and creates real value for money by levying a tax and accepting money for tax payments. Tax reallocates the distribution of liquidity in the economy. An increase in tax, by increasing fiscal surplus and the real value of money, reduces the equilibrium ...
-
作者：Kamishiro, Yusuke; Vohra, Rajiv; Serrano, Roberto
作者单位：Kanto Gakuin University; Brown University
摘要：This paper provides a noncooperative approach to core stability in an economy with incomplete information. We study the perfect Bayesian equilibria of an extensive form mechanism that extends the one used by Serrano and Vohra (1997) to implement the core of a complete-information economy. This leads to a version of the core that we refer to as the sequential core, which allows for information to be transmitted among the agents during the process of coalition formation. Such information flows i...
-
作者：Suzuki, Toru
作者单位：University of Technology Sydney
摘要：This paper studies a sender-receiver game in which both players want the receiver to choose the state-optimal action. Before observing the state, the sender observes a contextual signal, a payoff-irrelevant signal that correlates with states and is imperfectly shared with the receiver. Once the sender observes the state, the sender sends a message to the receiver, incurring a small messaging cost. It is shown that there is no miscommunication in any efficient equilibrium if the messaging cost ...
-
作者：Ball, Ian; Kattwinkel, Deniz
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); University of London; University College London
-
作者：Gomes, Joao F.; Grotteria, Marco; Wachter, Jessica A.
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; University of London; London Business School
摘要：Large crises tend to follow rapid credit expansions. Causality, however, is far from obvious. We show how this pattern arises naturally when financial intermediaries optimally exploit economic rents that drive their franchise value. As this franchise value fluctuates over the business cycle, so too do the incentives to engage in risky lending. The model leads to novel insights on the effects of unconventional monetary policies in developed economies. We argue that bank lending might have respo...
-
作者：Bloch, Francis; Dutta, Bhaskar; Dziubinski, Marcin
作者单位：heSam Universite; Universite Pantheon-Sorbonne; Paris School of Economics; University of Warwick; University of Warsaw
摘要：We consider a problem of mechanism design without money, where a planner selects a winner among a set of agents with binary types and receives outside signals (like the report of external referees). We show that there is a gap between the optimal Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatible (DSIC) mechanism and the optimal Bayesian Incentive Compatible (BIC) mechanism. In the optimal BIC mechanism, the planner can leverage the outside signal to elicit information about agents' types. BIC mechanisms ...
-
作者：Fernandez-Villaverde, Jesus; Sanches, Daniel
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; National Bureau of Economic Research; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Philadelphia
摘要：We present a micro-founded monetary model of a small open economy to examine the behavior of money, prices, and output under the gold standard. In particular, we formally analyze Hume's celebrated price-specie flow mechanism. Our framework incorporates the influence of international trade on the money supply in the Home country through gold flows. In the short run, a positive correlation exists between the quantity of money and the price level. Additionally, we demonstrate that money is non-ne...
-
作者：Schaal, Edouard; Taschereau-Dumouchel, Mathieu
作者单位：ICREA; Pompeu Fabra University; Centre de Recerca en Economia Internacional (CREI); Cornell University
摘要：This paper explores whether rational herding can generate endogenous aggregate fluctuations. We embed a tractable model of rational herding into a business cycle framework. In the model, technological inno-vations arrive with unknown qualities, and agents have dispersed information about how productive the technology really is. Rational investors decide whether to invest based on their private information and the investment behavior of others. Herd-driven boom-bust cycles arise endogenously in...
-
作者：Basteck, Christian; Ehlers, Lars
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal
摘要：We study the random assignment of indivisible objects among a set of agents with strict preferences. We show that there exists no mechanism which is unanimous, strategy-proof and envy-free. Weakening the first requirement to q-unanimity - i.e., when every agent ranks a different object at the top, then each agent shall receive his most-preferred object with probability of at least q - we show that a mechanism satisfying strategy-proofness, envy-freeness and ex-post weak non-wastefulness can be...
-
作者：Eilat, Ran; Neeman, Zvika
作者单位：Ben-Gurion University of the Negev; Tel Aviv University
摘要：We study how the suspicion that communicated information might be deceptive affects the nature of what can be communicated in a sender-receiver game. Sender is said to deceive Receiver if she sends a message that induces a belief that is different from the belief that should have been induced in the realized state. Deception is costly to Sender and the cost is endogenous: it is increasing in the distance between the induced belief and the belief that should have been induced. A message functio...
