The analogical foundations of cooperation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Jehiel, Philippe; Samuelson, Larry
• 署名单位: University of London; University of London Institute in Paris; Yale University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105609
• 发表日期: 2023
• 关键词: Analogical reasoning; COOPERATION; Prisoners? dilemma; Repeated game; private monitoring

摘要

We offer an approach to cooperation in repeated games of private monitoring in which players construct models of their opponents' behavior by observing the frequencies of play in a record of past plays of the game in which actions but not signals are recorded. Players construct models of their opponent's behavior by grouping the histories in the record into a relatively small number of analogy classes for which they estimate probabilities of cooperation. The incomplete record and the limited number of analogy classes lead to misspecified models that provide the incentives to cooperate. We provide conditions for the existence of equilibria supporting cooperation and equilibria supporting high payoffs for some nontrivial analogy partitions.(c) 2023 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons .org /licenses /by -nc -nd /4 .0/).