Linear Riley equilibria in quadratic signaling games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Weng, Xi; Wu, Fan; Yin, Xundong
• 署名单位: Peking University; California Institute of Technology; Central University of Finance & Economics
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105733
• 发表日期: 2023
• 关键词: Signaling; Riley equilibria; Linear strategy

摘要

We study signaling games with quadratic payoffs. As signaling games admit multiple separating equilibria, many equilibrium selection rules are proposed and a well-known solution is Riley equilibria. They are separating equilibria in which the sender achieves the highest equilibrium payoff for all types among all separating equilibria. We analyze the conditions for Riley equilibria to be linear, a common assumption in many applications. We derive a sufficient and necessary condition for the existence and uniqueness of linear Riley equilibria. We apply the result to confirm the dominance of linear equilibria in some classic examples, and we show that, in some other examples, there exist previously unknown nonlinear Riley equilibria. (c) 2023 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.