Sequential Bayesian persuasion

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Wu, Wenhao
• 署名单位: ShanghaiTech University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105763
• 发表日期: 2023
• 关键词: Bayesian persuasion; multiple senders; perfect Bayesian equilibrium; COMMUNICATION

摘要

I study a Bayesian persuasion model in which multiple senders sequentially persuade one receiver, after observing signal structures of prior senders and their realizations. I develop a geometric method, recursive concavification , to characterize the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium paths. I prove the existence of the silent equilibrium , where at most one sender provides nontrivial information. I also show that when there are only two senders and the receiver has a finite action space, it is generically without loss to focus on silent equilibrium. Finally, I show that if there are two senders who have zero-sum payoffs, the truth-telling signal structure is always supported in equilibrium.(c) 2023 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.