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作者：Lichtig, Avi; Weksler, Ran
作者单位：University of Bonn; University of Haifa
摘要：Does a better-informed sender transmit more accurate information in equilibrium? We show that, in a general class of voluntary disclosure games, unlike other strategic communication environments, the answer is positive. If the sender's evidence is more Blackwell informative, then the receiver's equilibrium utility increases. We apply our main result to show that an uninformed sender who chooses a test from a Blackwell -ordered set does so efficiently. (c) 2023 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：del Mercato, Elena L.; Van-Quy Nguyen
作者单位：Paris School of Economics
摘要：We consider a pure exchange economy with consumption externalities in preferences. We use the notion of competitive equilibrium a la Nash. We provide the Social Redistribution assumption to restore the Second Welfare Theorem. We then introduce the differentiable characterizations of Social and Strong Redistribution. We show that all these conditions are weaker than other relevant assumptions studied in the literature. Our conditions entail interesting results on the decentralized implementatio...
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作者：Heller, Yuval; Nehama, Ilan
作者单位：Bar Ilan University; University of Haifa
摘要：We examine the evolutionary basis for risk aversion with respect to aggregate risk. We study populations in which agents face choices between alternatives with different levels of aggregate risk. We show that the choices that maximize the long-run growth rate are induced by a heterogeneous population in which the least and most risk-averse agents are indifferent between facing an aggregate risk and obtaining its linear and harmonic mean for sure, respectively. Moreover, approximately optimal b...
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作者：Faro, Jose Heleno
作者单位：Insper
摘要：We propose the notion of replicas in the context of discrete choices and introduce axioms that charac-terize the Luce model with replicas. This model does not fall prey to the well-known red bus-blue bus example originally proposed by Debreu (1960) and later made famous by McFadden. Our model satisfies regularity, strong stochastic transitivity, and is a random utility model. Due to its simplicity, this model is more parsimonious than others aimed at overcoming the duplicates problem.(c) 2022 ...
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作者：Albrecht, James; Cai, Xiaoming; Gautier, Pieter; Vroman, Susan
作者单位：Georgetown University; IZA Institute Labor Economics; Peking University Shenzhen Graduate School (PKU Shenzhen); Peking University; Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute
摘要：The literature offers two interpretations of competitive search equilibrium, one based on a Nash approach and the other on a market-maker approach. When each buyer visits only one seller, the two approaches are equivalent. However, when each buyer visits multiple sellers, this equivalence can break down. We present a model in which every buyer visits 2 sellers. A buyer who trades with one seller receives a value of s, while a buyer who trades with 2 sellers receives value 1. Letting s vary fro...
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作者：Li, Fei; Song, Yangbo; Zhao, Mofei
作者单位：University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen; Beihang University
摘要：We study adversarial information design in a regime-change context. A continuum of agents simultane-ously chooses whether to attack the current regime. The attack succeeds if and only if the mass of attackers outweighs the regime's strength. A designer manipulates information about the regime's strength to main-tain the status quo. Our optimal information structure exhibits local obfuscation: some agents receive a signal matching the regime's true strength, and others receive an elevated signa...
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作者：Vaccari, Federico
作者单位：University of Bergamo
摘要：This paper studies a communication game between an uninformed decision maker and two perfectly informed senders with conflicting interests. Senders can misreport information at a cost that increases with the size of the misrepresentation. The main result concerns the characterization of equilibria with desirable properties: they always exist, are essentially unique, and are robust. Information transmission is partial in these equilibria, and persuasion occurs on the equilibrium path. By contra...
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作者：Keister, Todd; Mitkov, Yuliyan
作者单位：Rutgers University System; Rutgers University Camden; Rutgers University New Brunswick; University of Bonn
摘要：We study the interaction between the government's bailout policy and a bank's willingness to impose losses on (or bail in) investors based on its private information. In the absence of regulation, bail-ins in the early stages of a crisis are too small, while bailouts are too large and too frequent. Moreover, the bank may face a run by informed investors, creating further distortions and leading to a larger bailout. We show how a regulator with limited information can raise welfare and, in some...
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作者：Karantounias, Anastasios G.
作者单位：University of Surrey
摘要：This paper analyzes optimal policy in setups where both the policymaker and the private sector have doubts about the probability model of uncertainty and form endogenous worst-case beliefs. There are two forces that shape optimal policy results: a) the manipulation of the endogenous beliefs of the private sector so that the forward-looking constraints that the policymaker is facing are relaxed, b) the discrepancy (if any) in pessimistic beliefs between a paternalistic policymaker and the priva...
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作者：McAdams, David; Song, Yangbo; Zou, Dihan
作者单位：Duke University; Duke University; The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen; University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill
摘要：During an infectious-disease epidemic, people make choices that impact transmission, trading off the risk of infection with the social-economic benefits of activity. We investigate how the qualitative features of an epidemic's Nash-equilibrium trajectory depend on the nature of the economic benefits that people get from activity. If economic benefits do not depend on how many others are active, as usually modeled, then there is a unique equilibrium trajectory, the epidemic eventually reaches a...
