Inefficiency of Random Serial Dictatorship under incomplete information

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Akyol, Ethem
• 署名单位: TOBB Ekonomi ve Teknoloji University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105741
• 发表日期: 2023
• 关键词: Allocation without transfers; Bayesian incentive compatibility; random serial dictatorship; Random Boston; mechanism

摘要

We study the problem of allocating n objects to n agents without monetary transfers in a setting where each agent's preference over objects is private. We assume that each agent's value vector (values for n objects) is independently drawn from an exchangeable distribution and show that the celebrated Random Serial Dictatorship mechanism is welfare inferior to another allocation method, the Random Boston mechanism, when the number of agents and objects is large. Specifically, every type of every agent has a strictly higher interim expected utility under the Random Boston mechanism than under the Random Serial Dictatorship mechanism. Moreover, this strict dominance holds even at the limit. (c) 2023 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.