Task allocation and on-the-job training

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Baccara, Mariagiovanna; Lee, SangMok; Yariv, Leeat
• 署名单位: Washington University (WUSTL); Washington University (WUSTL); Princeton University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2022.105587
• 发表日期: 2023
• 关键词: Dynamic matching; Training-by-doing; market design

摘要

We study dynamic task allocation when providers' expertise evolves endogenously through training. We characterize optimal assignment protocols and compare them to discretionary procedures, where it is the clients who select their service providers. Our results indicate that welfare gains from centralization are greater when tasks arrive more rapidly, and when training technologies improve. Monitoring seniors' backlog of clients always increases welfare but may decrease training. Methodologically, we explore a matching setting with endogenous types, and illustrate useful adaptations of queueing theory techniques for such environments. (c) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.