An ordinal Shapley value for economic environments

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Pérez-Castrillo, D; Wettstein, D
• 署名单位: Ben-Gurion University of the Negev; Autonomous University of Barcelona; Autonomous University of Barcelona
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2004.11.007
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 296-308
• 关键词: non-transferable utility games; Shapley value; ordinal Shapley value; Consistency; fairness

摘要

We propose a new solution concept to address the problem of sharing a surplus among the agents generating it. The problem is formulated in the preferences-endowments space. The solution is defined recursively, incorporating notions of consistency and fairness and relying on properties satisfied by the Shapley value for transferable utility (TU) games. We show a solution exists, and call it the ordinal Shapley value (OSV). We characterize the OSV using the notion of coalitional dividends, and furthermore show it is monotone and anonymous. (c) 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.