Public goods with congestion

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Birulin, Oleksii
• 署名单位: University of Sydney
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2005.01.003
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 289-299
• 关键词: Public goods; fixed capacity; EFFICIENCY; budget balance

摘要

I consider the problem of the efficient provision of a congested (limited capacity) public good in a setting with asymmetric information. I show. in particular. that when the capacity of the good is limited, in a wide class of economies it is possible to Construct an incentive compatible mechanism that always produces the good at the efficient level. balances the budget and satisfies voluntary participation constraints. This result is in contrast with the corresponding impossibiliry result for pure public goods due to Mailath and Postlewaite (Rev. Econ. Stud. 57 (1990) 351-359) and Rob (J. Econ. Theory 47 (1989) 307-333). (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.