Credible group stability in many-to-many matching problems

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Konishi, Hideo; Unver, M. Utku
• 署名单位: Boston College; Koc University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2005.02.001
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 57-80
• 关键词: many-to-many matching; Pairwise stability; Group stability; credible deviation; Coalition-proof Nash equilibrium

摘要

It is known that in two-sided many-to-many matching problems. pairwise-stable matchings may not be immune to group deviations. unlike in many-to-one matching problems (Blair. 1988). In this paper, we show that pairwise stability is equivalent to credible group stability when one side has responsive preferences and the other side has categorywise-responsive preferences. A credibly group-stable matching is immune to any executable group deviations with an appropriate definition of executability. Under the same preference restriction. we also show the equivalence between the set of pairwise-stable matchings and the set of matchings generated by coalition-proof Nash equilibria of an appropriately defined strategic-form game. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.