Waiting to settle: Multilateral bargaining with subjective biases

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ali, S. Nageeb M.
• 署名单位: Stanford University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2005.04.003
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 109-137
• 关键词: optimism; Multilateral bargaining; delay

摘要

We study multilateral bargaining games where agents disagree over their bargaining power. We show that if agents are extremely optimistic, there may be costly delays in an arbitrarily long finite game but if optimism is moderate, all sufficiently long games end in immediate agreement. We show that the game with extreme optimism is highly unstable in the finite-horizon, and we examine the ramifications of this instability on the infinite-horizon problem. Finally, we consider other voting rules, and show that the majority-rule may be more efficient than the unanimity rule when agents are optimistic. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.