-
作者：Ghiglino, Christian; Venditti, Alain
作者单位：University of London; Queen Mary University London; University of Bern; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Aix-Marseille Universite
摘要：We explore the link between wealth inequality, preference heterogeneity and macroeconomic volatility in a two-sector neoclassical growth model. First we prove that, if agents have homogeneous preferences, when the absolute risk tolerance is a strictly convex (concave) function, sufficiently high (low) levels of wealth inequality may lead to endogenous fluctuations in the neighborhood of the steady state. Second, we consider the effects of preference heterogeneity when agents are homogeneous wi...
-
作者：Mandler, Michael
作者单位：University of London; Royal Holloway University London
摘要：We define rationality and equilibrium when states specify agents' actions and agents have arbitrary partitions over these states. Although some suggest that this natural modeling step leads to paradox, we show that Bayesian equilibrium is well defined and puzzles can be circumvented. The main problem arises when player j's partition informs j of i's move and i knows j's strategy. Then i's inference about j's move will vary with i's own move, and i may consequently play a dominated action. Plau...
-
作者：Aoyagi, Masaki
作者单位：University of Osaka
摘要：This paper studies collusion in repeated auctions when bidders communicate prior to each stage auction. For independent and correlated private signals and general interdependent values, the paper identifies conditions under which an equilibrium collusion scheme is fully efficient in the sense that the bidders' payoff is close to what they get when the object is allocated to the highest valuation bidder at the reserve price in every period. (c) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
-
作者：Noeldeke, Georg; Samuelson, Larry
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; University of Bonn
摘要：This paper presents simple sufficient conditions under which optimal bunches in adverse-selection principal-agent problems can be characterized without using optimal control theory. (c) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
-
作者：Basu, Kaushik; Mitra, Tapan
作者单位：Cornell University
摘要：A definition of a utilitarian social welfare relation (SWR) for infinite utility streams is proposed. Such a relation is characterized in terms of the Pareto. Anonymity and Partial Unit Comparability Axioms. The merits of the utilitarian SWR, relative to the more restrictive SWR induced by the overtaking criterion, are examined. (c) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
-
作者：Kamihigashi, Takashi; Roy, Santanu
作者单位：Kobe University; Southern Methodist University
摘要：This paper analyzes the nature of economic dynamics in a one-sector optimal growth model in which the technology is generally nonconvex, nondifferentiable, and discontinuous. The model also allows for irreversible investment and unbounded growth. We develop various tools to overcome the technical difficulties posed by the generality of the model. We provide sufficient conditions for optimal paths to be bounded, to converge to zero, to be bounded away from zero, and to grow unboundedly. We also...
-
作者：Sandholm, William H.
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：We study the implementation of efficient behavior in settings with externalities. A planner would like to ensure that a group of agents make socially optimal choices, but he only has limited information about the agents' preferences, and can only distinguish individual agents through the actions they choose. We describe the agents' behavior using a stochastic evolutionary model, assuming that their choice probabilities are given by the logit choice rule. We prove that there is a simple price s...
-
作者：Berliant, Marcus; Kung, Fan-chin
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL); Academia Sinica - Taiwan; City University of Hong Kong
摘要：We study the indeterminacy of equilibrium in the Fujita-Krugman [When is the economy monocentric?: von Thunen and Chamberlin unified, Reg. Sci. Urban Econ. 25 (1995) 505-528] model of city formation under monopolistic competition and increasing returns. Both the number and the locations of cities are endogenously determined. Assuming smooth transportation costs, we examine equilibria in city-economies where a finite number of cities form endogenously. For any positive integer K, the set of equ...
-
作者：Caplin, Andrew; Leahy, John
作者单位：New York University
摘要：We introduce a new class of finite horizon stochastic decision problems in which preferences change over time, and provide a proof of the existence of a recursively optimal strategy. Recursive optimization techniques dominate many areas of economic dynamics. However, in decision problems in which tastes change over time, the solution technique most commonly applied is not recursive, but rather strategic (subgame perfection). In this paper we argue in favor of the recursive approach, and we tak...
-
作者：Genicot, Garance; Ray, Debraj
作者单位：Georgetown University; New York University
摘要：A single principal interacts with several agents, offering them contracts. The crucial assumption of this paper is that the outside-option payoffs of the agents depend positively on how many uncontracted or free agents there are. We study how such a principal, unwelcome though he may be, approaches the problem of contract provision to agents when coordination failure among the latter group is explicitly ruled out. Two variants are considered. When the principal cannot re-approach agents, there...
