Bayesian beliefs with stochastic monotonicity: An extension of Machina and Schmeidler

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Grant, Simon; Polak, Ben
• 署名单位: Yale University; Rice University; Australian National University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2005.03.006
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 264-282
• 关键词: Subjective probability; Stochastic monotonicity; INDEPENDENCE; Horse/Roulette lotteries; Anscombe-Aumann

摘要

Machina and Schmeidler show that the probabilistic sophistication can be obtained in an Anscombe-Aumann setting without imposing expected utility by maintaining stochastic monotonicity and adding a new axiom loosely analogous to Savage's P4. This analogous axiom, however, is very strong. In this note, we obtain probabilistic sophistication using a weaker (and more natural) analog of Savage's P4. Stochastic monotonicity is sufficient to bridge the gap, where Anscombe and Aumman use independence twice, we use stochastic monotonicity twice. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.