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作者：Silveira, Rafael; Wright, Randall
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis
摘要：We study a market where innovators, who are good at coming up with ideas, can sell them to entrepreneurs, who might be better at implementing them. The market is decentralized, with random matching and bargaining. Ideas are characterized by five salient features: they are indivisible; partially nonrival; intermediate inputs; subject to informational frictions; and difficult to collateralize. This last feature gives rise to a demand by entrepreneurs for liquidity. We determine which ideas get t...
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作者：Arellano, Cristina; Heathcote, Jonathan
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; National Bureau of Economic Research; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：How does a country's exchange rate regime impact its ability to borrow from abroad? We build a small open economy model in which the government responds to shocks by adjusting monetary policy and foreign borrowing. Sovereign borrowing is subject to endogenous limits, which ensure repayment when the default punishment corresponds to financial autarky. Dollarizing implies renouncing monetary policy, but can make access to international debt markets more valuable, thereby loosening borrowing cons...
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作者：Ivanov, Maxim
作者单位：McMaster University
摘要：This paper focuses on issues of allocating authority between an uninformed principal and an informed expert. We analyze the benefits of informational control-restricting the precision of the expert's information (without learning its content). In this case, the result of Dessein (2002) [8] that delegating decisions to a perfectly informed expert is better than communication when preferences between the expert and the principal are not too far apart is reversed. We demonstrate that these organi...
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作者：Nehring, Klaus; Puppe, Clemens
作者单位：Helmholtz Association; Karlsruhe Institute of Technology; University of California System; University of California Davis
摘要：In a general framework of abstract binary aggregation, we characterize aggregation problems in terms of the monotone Arrowian aggregators they admit. Specifically, we characterize the problems that admit non-dictatorial, locally non-dictatorial, anonymous, and neutral monotone Arrowian aggregation, respectively. As a consequence of these characterizations, we also obtain new results on the possibility of strategy-proof social choice and the concrete Arrowian aggregation of preferences into a s...
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作者：Kovac, Eugen; Mylovanov, Tymofiy
作者单位：University of Bonn; Czech Academy of Sciences; Economics Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences; Charles University Prague; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要：We analyze relative performance of stochastic and deterministic mechanisms in an environment that has been extensively studied in the literature on communication (e.g., [Vincent R Crawford, Joel Sobel, Strategic information transmission, Econometrica 50 (6) (1982) 1431-1451]) and optimal delegation (e.g., [Bengt Holmstrom, On the theory of delegation, in: M. Boyer, R.E. Kihlstrom (Eds.), Bayesian Models in Economic Theory, North-Holland, 1984, pp. 115-141]): a principal-agent model with hidden...
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作者：Ambrus, Attila
作者单位：Harvard University
摘要：This paper generalizes the concept of best response to coalitions of players and offers epistemic definitions of coalitional rationalizability in normal form games. The (best) response of a coalition is defined to be an operator from sets of conjectures to sets of strategies. A strategy is epistemic coalitionally rationalizable if it is consistent with rationality and common certainty that every coalition is rational. A characterization of this solution set is provided for operators satisfying...
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作者：Lamy, Laurent
摘要：The analysis of second price auctions with externalities is utterly modified if the seller is unable to commit not to participate in the mechanism. For the General Symmetric Model introduced by Milgrom and Weber [P. Milgrom, R. Weber, A theory of auctions and competitive bidding, Econometrica 50 (1982) 1089-1122] we characterize the full set of separating equilibria that are symmetric among buyers and with a strategic seller being able to bid in the same way as any buyer through a so-called sh...
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作者：Milgrom, Paul; Strulovici, Bruno
作者单位：University of Oxford; University of Oxford; Stanford University
摘要：This paper identifies two notions of substitutes for auction and equilibrium analysis. Weak substitutes, the usual price-theory notion, guarantees monotonicity of tatonnement processes and convergence of clock auctions to a pseudo-equilibrium, but only strong substitutes, which treats each unit traded as a distinct good with its own price, guarantees that every pseudo-equilibrium is a Walrasian equilibrium, that the Vickrey outcome is in the core, and that the law of aggregate demand is satisf...
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作者：Green, Edward J.
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要：An analytically tractable model of a competitive, full-information economy is provided in which, for some parameter values, entry and exit over the course of the business cycle is concentrated among small firms. This model is intended to make the logical point that the relatively high sensitivity of small firms to business-cycle fluctuations does not necessarily indicate the presence of informational or incentive constraints in financial markets. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Pablo Rincon-Zapatero, Juan; Santos, Manuel S.
作者单位：Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; University of Miami
摘要：This paper studies first-order differentiability properties of the value function in concave dynamic programs. Motivated by economic considerations, we dispense with commonly imposed interiority assumptions. We suppose that the correspondence of feasible choices varies with the vector of state variables, and we allow the optimal solution to belong to the boundary of this correspondence. Under minimal assumptions we prove that the value function is continuously differentiable. We then discuss t...
