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作者：Martins-da-Rocha, V. Filipe; Riedel, Frank
作者单位：University of Bielefeld; Getulio Vargas Foundation
摘要：State prices are the fundamental building block for dynamic asset pricing models. We provide here a general continuous-time setup that allows to derive non-trivial structural properties for state-prices from economic fundamentals. To this end, we combine general equilibrium theory and theorie generale of stochastic processes to characterize state prices that lead to continuous price systems on the consumption set. We also show that equilibria with such state prices exist. (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc...
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作者：Mitchell, Matthew; Zhang, Yuzhe
作者单位：University of Iowa; University of Toronto
摘要：This paper studies the design of unemployment insurance when neither the searching effort nor the savings of an unemployed agent can be monitored. If the principal could monitor the savings, the optimal policy would leave the agent savings-constrained. With a constant absolute risk-aversion (CARA) utility function, we obtain a closed form solution of the optimal contract. Under the optimal contract, the agent is neither saving nor borrowing constrained. Counter-intuitively, his consumption dec...
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作者：Moscarini, Giuseppe; Squintani, Francesco
作者单位：University of Essex; Yale University; University of Brescia
摘要：We study a winner-take-all R&D race between two firms that are privately informed about the arrival rate of an invention. Over time, each firm only observes whether the opponent left the race or not. The equilibrium displays a strong herding effect, that we call a 'survivor's curse.' Unlike in the case of symmetric information, the two firms may quit the race (nearly) simultaneously even when their costs and benefits for research differ significantly. (C) 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Baranchuk, Nina; Dybvig, Philip H.; Yang, Jun
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL); University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas; Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; IU Kelley School of Business
摘要：Disclosure by firms would seem to reduce investment inefficiency by reducing informational asymmetry. However, the impact of disclosure is endogenous and depends on incentives within the firm. Given optimal renegotiation-proof contracts, disclosing only accepted contracts does not solve the Myers-Majluf problem. What solves the problem is having either full transparency of all compensation negotiations or, more reasonably, additional forward-looking announcements. The model is robust to renego...
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作者：List, Christian; Polak, Ben
作者单位：University of London; London Business School; Yale University; Yale University; University of London; London Business School
摘要：This introduces the symposium on judgment aggregation. The theory of judgment aggregation asks how several individuals' judgments on some logically connected propositions can be aggregated into consistent collective judgments. The aim of this introduction is to show how ideas from the familiar theory of preference aggregation can be extended to this more general case. We first translate a proof of Arrow's impossibility theorem into the new setting, so as to motivate some of the central concept...
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作者：Gossner, Olivier; Hoerner, Johannes
作者单位：Paris School of Economics; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Yale University
摘要：We study the relationship between a player's lowest equilibrium payoff in a repeated game with imperfect monitoring and this player's min max payoff in the corresponding one-shot game. We characterize the signal structures under which these two payoff's coincide for any payoff matrix. Under an identifiability assumption, we further show that, if the monitoring structure of an infinitely repeated game nearly satisfies this condition, then these two payoffs are approximately equal, independently...
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作者：Kojima, Fuhito; Manea, Mihai
作者单位：Stanford University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：The probabilistic serial mechanism (Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2001 [9]) is ordinally efficient but not strategy-proof. We study incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism for large assignment problems. We establish that for a fixed set of object types and an agent with a given expected utility function, if there are sufficiently many copies of each object type, then reporting ordinal preferences truthfully is a weakly dominant strategy for the agent (regardless of the number of other agent...
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作者：Carroll, Gabriel
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：There are n agents who have von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions on a finite set of alternatives A. Each agent i's utility function is known to lie in the nonempty, convex, relatively open set U-i. Suppose L is a lottery on A that is undominated, meaning that there is no other lottery that is guaranteed to Pareto dominate L no matter what the true utility functions are. Then, there exist utility functions u(i) is an element of U-i for which L is Pareto efficient. This result includes the ...
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作者：Amir, Rabah; Garcia, Filomena; Knauff, Malgorzata
作者单位：University of Arizona; Universidade de Lisboa; Warsaw School of Economics
摘要：This paper is an attempt to develop a unified approach to symmetry-breaking in strategic models arising in industrial organization by constructing two general classes of two-player symmetric games that always possess only asymmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibria. These classes of games are characterized in some abstract sense by two general properties: payoff nonconcavities and some form of strategic substitutability. Our framework relies on easily verified assumptions on the primitives of the...
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作者：Moscarini, Giuseppe; Wright, Randall
作者单位：Yale University; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：This introduces the Symposium on Search Theory and Applications. (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
