-
作者：Bosmans, Kristof; Lauwers, Luc; Ooghe, Erwin
作者单位：KU Leuven; Maastricht University
摘要：The unidimensional Pigou-Dalton transfer principle demands that a regressive transfer in income-a transfer from worse-off (poor) to better-off (rich)-decreases social welfare. In a multidimensional setting the direct link between income (or any other attribute) and individual well-being is absent. We interpret the social welfare level of a distribution in which each individual has the same bundle as the individual wellbeing level. We define regressivity on the basis of this individual well-bei...
-
作者：Martimort, David; Stole, Lars
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; University of Chicago
摘要：We characterize equilibrium payoffs of a delegated common agency game in a public good context where principals use smooth contribution schedules. We prove that under complete information, payoff vectors of equilibria with truthful schedules coincide with the set of smooth equilibrium payoffs, including non-truthful schedules. We next consider whether the presence of arbitrarily small amounts of asymmetric information is enough to refine this payoff set. Providing that the extensions of the eq...
-
作者：Noor, Jawwad
作者单位：Boston University
摘要：The experimental literature on time preference finds that the manner in which subjects discount money (as opposed to utility) exhibits properties known as Decreasing Impatience and the Magnitude Effect. While these findings are often referred to as anomalies for the Exponential Discounting model, several authors have demonstrated that each of these qualitative findings can be explained by the curvature of utility and thus are not anomalies. We prove that, under basic regularity conditions, the...
-
作者：Degan, Arianna; Merlo, Antonio
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; University of Quebec; University of Quebec Montreal; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：In this paper we address the following question: To what extent is the hypothesis that voters vote ideologically (i.e., they always vote for the candidate who is ideologically closest to them) testable or falsifiable? We show that using data only on how individuals vote in a single election, the hypothesis that voters vote ideologically is irrefutable, regardless of the number of candidates competing in the election. On the other hand, using data on how the same individuals vote in multiple el...
-
作者：Eichner, Thomas; Pethig, Ruediger
作者单位：University of Bielefeld; Universitat Siegen
摘要：In an integrated dynamic general equilibrium model of the economy and the ecosystem humans and other species compete for land and prey biomass. Each submodel exhibits a price-driven competitive allocation mechanism, and the endogenously determined habitat is either openly accessible or privately owned. In both scenarios specific corrective taxes or subsidies are needed to internalize ecosystem externalities. An open access habitat causes additional inefficiencies through diverging prices for b...
-
作者：Rodrigues-Neto, Jose Alvaro
作者单位：Australian National University
摘要：We present new necessary and sufficient conditions for checking if a set of players' posteriors may come from a common prior. A simple diagrammatic device calculates the join and meet of players' knowledge partitions. Each cycle in the diagram has a corresponding cycle equation. Posteriors are consistent with a common prior if and only if all cycle equations are satisfied. We prove that in games of two players, where the join partition has only singletons, a common prior exists if each player'...
-
作者：Barillas, Francisco; Hansen, Lars Peter; Sargent, Thomas J.
作者单位：New York University; University of Chicago
摘要：Reinterpreting most of the market price of risk as a price of model uncertainty eradicates a link between asset prices and measures of the welfare costs of aggregate fluctuations that was proposed by Hansen, Sargent, and Tallarini [17], Tallarini [30], Alvarez and Jermann [1]. Prices of model uncertainty contain information about the benefits of removing model uncertainty, not the consumption fluctuations that Lucas [22,23] studied. A max-min expected utility theory lets us reinterpret Tallari...
-
作者：Goltsman, Maria; Hoerner, Johannes; Pavlov, Gregory; Squintani, Francesco
作者单位：Western University (University of Western Ontario); University of Brescia; University of Essex; Yale University
摘要：We compare three common dispute resolution processes - negotiation, mediation, and arbitration - in the framework of Crawford and Sobel [V. Crawford, J. Sobel, Strategic information transmission, Econometrica 50 (6) (1982) 1431-1451]. Under negotiation, the two parties engage in (possibly arbitrarily long) face-to-face cheap talk. Under mediation, the pat-ties communicate with a neutral third party who makes a non-binding recommendation. Under arbitration, the two parties commit to conform to ...
-
作者：Amarante, Massimiliano
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal
摘要：We study an axiomatic model of preferences, which contains as special cases Subjective Expected Utility, Choquet Expected Utility, Maxmin and Maxmax Expected Utility and many other models. First, we give a complete characterization of the class of functionals representing these preferences. Then, we show that any such functional can be represented as a Choquet integral I(f) = integral kappa(f)d nu where kappa : B(Sigma) -> A (C) is the canonical mapping from the space of bounded Sigma-measurab...
-
作者：Wiseman, Thomas
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要：Short-run competitors in the chain store game receive noisy signals of the long-run incumbent firm's type. The history of signals, which in the limit is fully revealing, is observable to the competitors but possibly not to the incumbent. As long as there is sufficient noise in the signals, then in any equilibrium a patient weak incumbent obtains a payoff strictly higher than her minmax payoff. (C) 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
