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作者：Celik, Gorkem
作者单位：University of British Columbia
摘要：We analyze an adverse selection environment with third party supervision. The supervisor is partly informed of the agent's type. The supervisor and the agent collude while interacting with the principal. Contracting with the agent directly and ignoring the presence of the supervisor constitutes the no-supervision benchmark. We show that delegating to the supervisor reduces the principal's payoff compared to the no-supervision benchmark under a standard condition on the distribution of the agen...
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作者：Kocherlakota, Narayana; Phelan, Christopher
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：This paper considers a model economy in which agents are privately informed about their type: their endowments of various goods and their preferences over these goods. While preference orderings over observable choices are allowed to be correlated with an agent's private type, we assume that the planner/government is both uncertain about the nature of this joint distribution and unable to choose among multiple equilibria of any given social mechanism. We model the planner/government as having ...
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作者：Farmer, Roger E. A.; Waggoner, Daniel F.; Zha, Tao
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Atlanta; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Emory University
摘要：We develop a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for equilibria to be determinate in a class of forward-looking Markov-switching rational expectations models and we develop an algorithm to check these conditions in practice. We use three examples, based on the new-Keynesian model of monetary policy, to illustrate our technique. Our work connects applied econometric models of Markov-switching with forward looking rational expectations models and allows an applied researcher to construct ...
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作者：Hong, Lu; Page, Scott
作者单位：Loyola University Chicago; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：Private information is typically modeled as signals. A joint probability distribution captures relationships between signals and between signals and relevant variables. In this paper, we define and contrast two types of signals: generated and interpreted. We demonstrate that even though the standard assumption of conditional independence is a reasonable benchmark assumption for generated signals, it imposes a specific, and unlikely structure on interpreted signals. We also show that independen...
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作者：Loisel, Olivier
摘要：We consider a broad class of linear dynamic stochastic rational-expectations models made of a finite number N of structural equations for N + 1 endogenous variables and to be closed by one policy feedback rule. We design, for any model of this class and any stationary VARMA solution of that model, a bubble-free policy feedback rule ensuring that this solution is not only the unique stationary solution of the closed model, but also its unique solution. We apply these results to locally linearis...
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作者：Luo, Xiao; Yang, Chih-Chun
作者单位：National University of Singapore; University of Rochester; Academia Sinica - Taiwan
摘要：In this paper we extend Ambrus's [A. Ambrus, Coalitional rationalizability, Quart. J. Econ. 121 (2006) 903-929] concept of coalitional rationalizability (c-rationalizability) to situations where, in seeking mutually beneficial interests, players in groups (i) make use of Bayes' rule in expectation calculations and (ii) contemplate various deviations, i.e., the validity of deviation is checked against any arbitrary sets of strategies, and not just only against restricted subsets of strategies. ...
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作者：Govindan, Srihari; Wilson, Robert
作者单位：Stanford University; University of Iowa
摘要：The Global Newton Method for games in normal form and in extensive form is shown to have a natural extension to computing Markov-perfect equilibria of stochastic games. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Martin, Alberto
作者单位：Centre de Recerca en Economia Internacional (CREI); Pompeu Fabra University
摘要：This paper characterizes the relationship between entrepreneurial wealth and aggregate investment under adverse selection. Its main finding is that such a relationship need not be monotonic. In particular, three results emerge from the analysis: (i) pooling equilibria, in which investment is independent of entrepreneurial wealth, are more likely to arise when entrepreneurial wealth is relatively low; (ii) separating equilibria, in which investment is increasing in entrepreneurial wealth, are m...
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作者：Che, Yeon-Koo; Kim, Jinwoo
作者单位：Yonsei University; Columbia University
摘要：We study an optimal collusion-proof auction in an environment where subsets of bidders may, collude not just on their bids but also on their participation. Despite their ability to collude on participation, informational asymmetry facing the potential colluders can be exploited significantly to weaken their collusive power. The second-best auction - i.e., the optimal auction in a collusion-free, environment - can be made collusion-proof, if at least one bidder is not collusive, or there are mu...
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作者：Moulin, Herve
作者单位：Rice University
摘要：Subsidy-free VCG mechanisms assign p identical objects to n agents. The efficiency loss is the largest ratio of budget surplus to efficient surplus, over all profiles of non-negative valuations. The smallest efficiency loss (L) over cap (n, p) satisfies (L) over cap (n, p) <= (L) over cap (n, left perpendicular/2right perpendicular) <= 4/3 root n. If p/n is bounded away from 1/2, (L) over cap (n, p) converges to zero exponentially in n. Participation is voluntary in the optimal mechanism achie...
