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作者：Desmet, Klaus; Rossi-Hansberg, Esteban
作者单位：Princeton University; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
摘要：Between 1970 and 2000 employment growth across U.S. counties exhibited very different patterns in manufacturing and services. Whereas manufacturing employment growth was negatively related to initial manufacturing employment across the entire distribution of counties, service employment growth was positively related to initial service employment for intermediate sized counties. This paper presents a theory to rationalize these facts. Local sectoral growth is driven by technological diffusion a...
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作者：Hofbauer, Josef; Sandholm, William H.
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; University of Vienna
摘要：We study a class of population games called stable games. These games are characterized by self-defeating externalities: when agents revise their strategies, the improvements in the payoffs of strategies to which revising agents are switching are always exceeded by the improvements in the payoffs of strategies which revising agents are abandoning. We prove that the set of Nash equilibria of a stable game is globally asymptotically stable under a wide range of evolutionary dynamics. Convergence...
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作者：Diecidue, Enrico; Schmidt, Ulrich; Zank, Horst
作者单位：University of Manchester; INSEAD Business School; University of Kiel; Leibniz Association; Institut fur Weltwirtschaft an der Universitat Kiel (IFW)
摘要：This paper provides preference foundations for parametric weighting functions under rank-dependent utility. This is achieved by decomposing the independence axiom of expected utility into separate meaningful properties. These conditions allow us to characterize rank-dependent utility with power and exponential weighting functions. Moreover, by allowing probabilistic risk attitudes to vary within the probability interval, a preference foundation for rank-dependent utility with parametric invers...
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作者：Gul, Faruk; Pesendorfer, Wolfgang
作者单位：Princeton University
摘要：We analyze candidate competition when some voters do not observe a candidate's policy choice. Voters have a personality preference when both candidates offer the same policy. In equilibrium, the candidate with a personality advantage may get elected with a partisan policy even though his opponent's policy is preferred by all voters. The departure from the Downsian prediction is most pronounced when candidates have a weak policy preference and care mostly about winning the election. In that cas...
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作者：Fudenberg, Drew; Levine, David K.
作者单位：Harvard University; Washington University (WUSTL)
摘要：We examine the role of off-path superstitions in macro-economics, and show how a false belief about off-path play is the key element underlying both the Lucas Critique and the game-theoretic concept of self-confirming equilibrium. However, the impact of false beliefs in these two cases is different: In the Lucas case, a policy maker's incorrect beliefs about off-path play can lead to the adoption of mistaken policy innovation. However, the consequences of such an innovation provide evidence th...
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作者：Jovanovic, Boyan
作者单位：New York University
摘要：This paper extends [R. Mehra, E.C. Prescott, Recursive competitive equilibrium: The case of homogeneous households, Econometrica 48 (1980) 1365-1380] to a production economy with two capital goods. It is an RBC model in which each unit of investment requires a new idea, an 'option.' When options are scarce, new capital is harder to put in place and the value of old capital rises. Thus the stock market and Tobin's Q are negative indexes of intangibles. During a boom, Q rises gradually, as optio...
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作者：Mortensen, Dale T.
作者单位：Northwestern University; Aarhus University
摘要：A plausible micro foundation for the matching function, postulated in models of equilibrium unemployment, is proposed. The flow of matches formed is an increasing and concave function of the number of jobs and workers to be matched holding the other constant, but exhibits increasing to scale. Nevertheless, the function is consistent with the observed Beveridge curve and the log linear relationship between the job finding rate and the vacancy-unemployment ratio. Although a market equilibrium in...
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作者：Rogerson, Richard; Wallenius, Johanna
作者单位：Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
摘要：We build a life cycle model of labor supply that incorporates changes along both the intensive and extensive margin and use it to assess the consequences of changes in tax and transfer policies on equilibrium hours of work. We find that changes in taxes have large aggregate effects on hours of work. Moreover, we find that there is no inconsistency between this result and the empirical finding of small labor elasticities for prime age workers. In our model, micro and macro elasticities are effe...
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作者：Labadie, Pamela
作者单位：George Washington University
摘要：Adverse selection economies with private information are generally studied under the assumption that contracts are exclusive. That is, retrading is prohibited. An alternative market mechanism, the anonymous mechanism, is studied here. Risk averse agents trade contingent claims directly and side markets are in equilibrium. The result is the anonymous equilibrium. The anonymous equilibrium results in a set of endogenous transfers and subsidies. (C) 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Garcia, Diego; Vanden, Joel M.
作者单位：University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要：We study the formation of mutual funds by generalizing the standard competitive noisy rational expectations framework. In our model, informed agents set up mutual funds as a means of selling their private information to uninformed agents. We study the case of imperfect competition among fund managers, where uninformed agents invest simultaneously in multiple mutual funds. The size of the assets under management in the mutual fund industry is determined by endogenizing the agents' information a...
