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作者：Wright, Randall
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis
摘要：The framework in Lagos and Wright (2005) [20] combining decentralized and centralized markets is used extensively in monetary economics. Much is known about that model, but there is a loose end: only under special assumptions about bargaining power or decentralized market preferences has it been shown that the monetary steady state is unique. For general decentralized market utility and bargaining, I prove uniqueness for generic parameters with fiat money, and for all parameters with commodity...
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作者：Ebrahimy, Ehsan; Shimer, Robert
作者单位：University of Chicago
摘要：We develop the implications of the stock flow matching model for unemployment, vacancies, and worker flows. Workers and jobs are heterogeneous, so most worker-job pairs cannot profitably match, leading to the coexistence of unemployment and vacancies. Productivity shocks cause fluctuations in the number of jobs, which in turn cause fluctuations in other labor market variables. We derive exact expressions for employment and for worker transition rates in a finite economy and analyze their limit...
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作者：Westkamp, Alexander
作者单位：University of Bonn
摘要：Ostrovsky (2008) [9] develops a theory of stability for a model of matching in exogenously given networks. For this model a generalization of pairwise stability, chain stability, can always be satisfied as long as agents' preferences satisfy same side substitutability and cross side complementarity. Given this preference domain I analyze the interplay between properties of the network structure and (cooperative) solution concepts. The main structural condition is an acyclicity notion that rule...
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作者：Blumrosen, Liad; Nisan, Noam
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：We study the inherent limitations of natural widely-used classes of ascending combinatorial auctions. Specifically, we show that ascending combinatorial auctions that do not use both non-linear prices and personalized prices cannot achieve social efficiency with general bidder valuations. We also show that the loss of efficiency can be severe and that only a diminishing fraction of the social welfare may be captured. This justifies the added complexity in the auctions suggested by, e.g., Parke...
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作者：Debortoli, Davide; Nunes, Ricardo
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：Due to time-inconsistency or political turnover, policymakers' promises are not always fulfilled. We analyze an optimal fiscal policy problem where the plans made by the benevolent government are periodically revised. In this loose commitment setting, the properties of labor and capital income taxes are significantly different than under the full-commitment and no-commitment assumptions. Because of the occasional reoptimizations, the average capital income tax is positive even in the long-run....
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作者：Krasa, Stefan; Polborn, Mattias
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
摘要：We introduce a model of electoral competition with office-motivated candidates who are exogenously committed to particular positions on some issues, while they choose positions for the remaining issues. A position is majority-efficient if a candidate cannot make a majority of the electorate better off, given his fixed positions. We characterize existence conditions for majority-efficient positions. The candidates' fixed positions in our framework imply that only some voters are swing voters, a...
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作者：Apesteguia, Jose; Huck, Steffen; Oechssler, Joerg; Weidenholzer, Simon
作者单位：Ruprecht Karls University Heidelberg; Pompeu Fabra University; University of London; University College London; University of London; University College London; University of Vienna
摘要：A well-known result by Vega-Redondo implies that in symmetric Cournot oligopoly, imitation leads to the Walrasian outcome where price equals marginal cost. In this paper we show that this result is not robust to the slightest asymmetry in fixed costs. Instead of obtaining the Walrasian outcome as unique prediction, every outcome where agents choose identical actions will be played some fraction of the time in the long run. We then conduct experiments to check this fragility. We obtain that, co...
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作者：Chambers, Christopher P.; Hayashi, Takashi
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; California Institute of Technology
摘要：A subjective expected utility agent is given information about the state of the world in the form of a set of possible priors. She is assumed to form her beliefs given this information. A set of priors may be updated according to Bayes' rule, prior-by-prior, upon learning that some state of the world has not obtained. In a model in which information is completely summarized by this set of priors, we show that there exists no decision maker who obeys Bayes' rule. conditions her prior only on th...
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作者：Denuit, Michel M.; Eeckhoudt, Louis
作者单位：Universite Catholique Louvain; Universite Catholique Louvain; IESEG School of Management; Universite Catholique Louvain
摘要：This paper aims to extend the results by Ross (1981) [15] and by Modica and Scarsini (2005) [13] to stochastic dominance of degree 4 and over. Specifically, it is shown that Ross' approach can be extended to any order of risk attitude beyond the generalization proposed by Modica and Scarsini by means of sth degree increase in risk defined by Ekern (1980) [8]. (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Lebrun, Bernard
作者单位：York University - Canada
摘要：When the price setter in post-auction resale is chosen according to exogenous probabilities, Hafalir and Krishna (2008) [2] showed that the first-price auction brings more expected revenues than the second-price auction with truth-bidding bidders. We complete their revenue ranking by proving that the first-price auction produces higher expected revenues the higher the probability the auction winner sets the resale price. (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
