Informational control and organizational design

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ivanov, Maxim
• 署名单位: McMaster University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2009.11.002
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 721-751
• 关键词: communication; INFORMATION; cheap talk

摘要

This paper focuses on issues of allocating authority between an uninformed principal and an informed expert. We analyze the benefits of informational control-restricting the precision of the expert's information (without learning its content). In this case, the result of Dessein (2002) [8] that delegating decisions to a perfectly informed expert is better than communication when preferences between the expert and the principal are not too far apart is reversed. We demonstrate that these organizational forms-informational control and delegation-can be either complements or substitutes, depending on the principal's ability to affect the expert's discretion about the set of allowed policies. (C) 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.