-
作者：Matsushima, Hitoshi; Miyazaki, Koichi; Yagi, Nobuyuki
作者单位：University of Tokyo; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; University of Tokyo
摘要：We investigate the adverse selection problem where a principal delegates multiple tasks to an agent. We characterize the virtually implementable social choice functions by using the linking mechanism proposed by Jackson and Sonnenschein (2007) [20] that restricts the message spaces. The principal does not require any incentive wage schemes and can therefore avoid any information rent and welfare loss. We show the resemblance between the functioning of this message space restriction and that of...
-
作者：Burdett, Ken; Coles, Melvyn
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; University of Essex
摘要：This paper investigates equilibria where firms post wage/tenure contracts and risk averse workers search for new job opportunities whether employed or unemployed. We generalize previous work by assuming firms have different productivities. Equilibrium implies more productive firms always offer more desirable contracts. Thus workers never quit from more productive firms for less productive firms. Nevertheless turnover is inefficient as employees with long tenures at low productivity firms may r...
-
作者：Grochulski, Borys; Kocherlakota, Narayana
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Richmond; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：In this paper, we consider economies in which agents are privately informed about their skills, which evolve stochastically over time. We require agents' preferences to be weakly separable between the lifetime paths of consumption and labor. However, we allow for intertemporal nonseparabilities in preferences like habit formation. In this environment, we derive a generalized version of the Inverse Euler Equation and use it to show that intertemporal wedges characterizing optimal allocations of...
-
作者：Okada, Akira
作者单位：Hitotsubashi University
摘要：We present a noncooperative foundation for the Nash bargaining solution for an n-person cooperative game in strategic form. The Nash bargaining solution should be immune to any coalitional deviations. Our noncooperative approach yields a new core concept, called the Nash core, for a cooperative game based on a consistency principle. We prove that the Nash bargaining solution can be supported (in every subgame) by a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium of the bargaining game if and only if th...
-
作者：Abraham, Arpad; Carceles-Poveda, Eva
作者单位：European University Institute; State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University
摘要：This paper endogenizes the borrowing constraints on capital in a production economy with incomplete markets. We find that these limits get looser with income, a property that is consistent with US data on credit limits. The framework with endogenous limits is then used to study the effects of a revenue neutral tax reform that eliminates capital income taxes. Our results illustrate that it is very important to take into account the effects of tax policies on the limits. Throughout the transitio...
-
作者：Bodenstein, Martin
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA
摘要：The empirical literature provides a wide range of estimates for trade elasticities at the aggregate level. Recent contributions in international macroeconomics suggest that low (implied) values of the trade elasticity may play an important role in understanding the disconnect between international prices and real variables. However, a standard model of the international business cycle displays multiple locally isolated equilibria if the trade is sufficiently low. The main contribution of this ...
-
作者：Cason, Timothy N.; Friedman, Daniel; Hopkins, Ed
作者单位：Purdue University System; Purdue University; University of California System; University of California Santa Cruz; University of Edinburgh
摘要：We report experiments studying mixed strategy Nash equilibria that are theoretically stable or unstable under learning. The Time Average Shapley Polygon (TASP) predicts behavior in the unstable case. We study two versions of Rock Paper Scissors that include a fourth strategy, Dumb. The unique Nash equilibrium is identical in the two games, but the predicted frequency of Dumb is much higher in the game where the NE is stable. Consistent with TASP, the observed frequency of Dumb is lower and pla...
-
作者：Bramoulle, Yann; Saint-Paul, Gilles
作者单位：Laval University; Laval University; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
摘要：This paper studies the dynamics of fundamental research. We develop a simple model where researchers allocate their effort between improving existing fields and inventing new ones. A key assumption is that scientists derive utility from recognition from other scientists. We show that the economy can be either in a regime where new fields are constantly invented, and then converges to a steady state, or in a cyclical regime where periods of innovation alternate with periods of exploitation. We ...
-
作者：Andolfatto, David
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - St. Louis; Simon Fraser University
摘要：I examine optimal monetary policy in a Lagos and Wright [R. Lagos, R. Wright, A unified framework for monetary theory and policy analysis, J. Polit. Economy 113 (2005) 463-484] model where trade is centralized and all exchange is voluntary. I identify a class of incentive-feasible policies that improve welfare beyond what is achievable with zero intervention. Any policy in this class necessarily entails a non-negative inflation rate and a strictly positive nominal interest rate. Despite the ab...
-
作者：Dietrich, Franz; List, Christian
作者单位：Maastricht University; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：In judgment aggregation, unlike preference aggregation, not much is known about domain restrictions that guarantee consistent majority outcomes. We introduce several conditions on individual judgments sufficient for consistent majority judgments. Some are based on global orders of propositions or individuals, others on local orders, still others not on orders at all. Some generalize classic social-choice-theoretic domain conditions, others have no counterpart. Our most general condition genera...
