-
作者：Fuchs, William; Skrzypacz, Andrzej
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Stanford University
摘要：We study dynamic bargaining with asymmetric information and interdependent values. We base our analysis on the equilibria characterized by Deneckere and Liang (2006) for the gap case. We show that as the gap between the cost and value of the weakest type shrinks to zero, the continuous time limit of equilibria changes dramatically from rare bursts of trade with long periods of inactivity to smooth screening over time. In the double limit prices are independent of the shape of the distribution ...
-
作者：Pavan, Alessandro; Lagos, Ricardo; Siniscalchi, Marciano; Vives, Xavier
-
作者：Alos-Ferrer, Carlos; Kuzmics, Christoph
作者单位：University of Cologne; University of Bielefeld
摘要：We provide a general formal framework to define and analyze the concepts of focal points and frames for normal form games. The information provided by a frame is captured by a symmetry structure which is consistent with the payoff structure of the game. The set of symmetry structures has itself a clear structure (a lattice). Focal points are strategy profiles which respect the symmetry structure and are chosen according to some meta-norm, which is not particular to the framed game at hand. (C)...
-
作者：Eraslan, Huelya; McLennan, Andrew
作者单位：Johns Hopkins University; University of Queensland
摘要：We study a model of sequential bargaining in which, in each period before an agreement is reached, the proposer's identity is randomly determined, the proposer suggests a division of a pie of size one, each other agent either approves or rejects the proposal, and the proposal is implemented if the set of approving agents is a winning coalition for the proposer. The theory of the fixed point index is used to show that stationary equilibrium expected payoffs of this coalitional bargaining game a...
-
作者：Azariadis, Costas; Kaas, Leo
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL); Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - St. Louis; University of Konstanz
摘要：We analyze an exchange economy of unsecured credit where borrowers have the option to declare bankruptcy in which case they are temporarily excluded from financial markets Endogenous credit limits are imposed that are just tight enough to prevent default. Economies with temporary exclusion differ from their permanent exclusion counterparts in two important properties. If households are extremely patient, then the first-best allocation is an equilibrium in the latter economies but not necessari...
-
作者：Lu, Jingfeng; Ye, Lixin
作者单位：National University of Singapore; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要：In auctions with private information acquisition costs, we completely characterize (socially) efficient and (revenue) optimal two-stage mechanisms, with the first stage being an entry right allocation mechanism and the second stage being a traditional private good provision mechanism. Both efficiency and revenue optimality require that the second-stage selling mechanism be ex post efficient and the number of entry slots be endogenously determined. We show that both efficient and optimal entry ...
-
作者：Ueda, Kenichi
作者单位：International Monetary Fund
摘要：Competition among banks promotes growth and stability for an economy with production externality. Following Arrow and Debreu (1954) [6], I formulate a standard growth model with externality a two-period version of Romer (1986) [39]-as a game among consumers, firms, and intermediaries. The Walrasian equilibrium, with an auctioneer, does not achieve the social optimum. Without an auctioneer or intermediaries, I show that no Nash equilibrium exists. With several banks strategically intermediating...
-
作者：Oury, Marion
作者单位：Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine
摘要：This paper examines many-player many-action global games with multidimensional state parameters. It establishes that the notion of noise-independent selection introduced by Frankel, Morris and Pauzner [D. Frankel, S. Morris, A. Pauzner, Equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities, J. Econ. Theory 108 (2003) 1-44] for one-dimensional global games is robust when the setting is extended to the one proposed by Carlsson and Van Damme [H. Carlsson, E. Van Damme, Global gam...
-
作者：Jackson, Matthew O.; Tan, Xu
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：A set of voters consults experts before voting over two alternatives. Experts observe private signals about the values of the alternatives and can reveal their information or conceal it, but cannot lie. We examine how disclosure and voting vary with preference biases, signal precision, and the voting rule. Unanimity rule can lead to greater information revelation and total utility than simple majority rule. The voting rule that maximizes information disclosure need not coincide with the voting...
-
作者：Basteck, Christian; Daniels, Tijmen R.; Heinemann, Frank
作者单位：Technical University of Berlin
摘要：Global games are widely used to predict behaviour in games with strategic complementarities and multiple equilibria. We establish two results on the global game selection. First, we show that, for any supermodular complete information game, the global game selection is independent of the payoff functions chosen for the game's global game embedding. Second, we give a simple sufficient criterion to derive the selection and establish noise independence in many-action games by decomposing them int...
