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作者：Kolotilin, Anton; Li, Hao; Li, Wei
作者单位：University of New South Wales Sydney; University of British Columbia
摘要：This article studies a principal-agent problem where the only commitment for the uninformed principal is to restrict the set of decisions she makes following a report by the informed agent. We show that an ex ante optimal equilibrium for the principal corresponds to a finite partition of the state space, and each retained decision is ex post suboptimal for the principal, biased toward the agent's preference. Generally an optimal equilibrium does not maximize the number of decisions the princip...
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作者：Anton, James J.; Biglaiser, Gary
作者单位：Duke University; University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill
摘要：We examine an infinite horizon model of quality growth for a durable goods monopoly. The seller may offer any bundle(s) of current and previous quality improvements (upgrades). Subgame perfect equilibrium seller payoffs range from capturing the full social surplus down to only the initial flow value of each good, as long as the value of all future quality growth exceeds the value of a single unit. Each of these payoffs is realized in a Markov perfect equilibrium that follows the socially effic...
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作者：Carbajal, Juan Carlos; McLennan, Andrew; Tourky, Rabee
作者单位：University of Queensland
摘要：In a setting where agents have quasi-linear utilities over social alternatives and a transferable commodity, we consider three properties that a social choice function may possess: truthful implementation (in dominant strategies); monotonicity in differences; and lexicographic affine maximization. We introduce the notion of a flexible domain of preferences that allows elevation of pairs and study which of these conditions implies which others in such domain. We provide a generalization of the ...
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作者：Sprumont, Yves
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal
摘要：A single valuable object must be allocated to at most one of n agents. Monetary transfers are possible and preferences are quasilinear. We offer an explicit description of the individually rational mechanisms which are Pareto-optimal in the class of feasible, strategy-proof, anonymous and envy-free mechanisms. These mechanisms form a one-parameter infinite family; the Vickrey mechanism is the only Groves mechanism in that family. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：van den Brink, Rene; van der Laan, Gerard; Moes, Nigel
作者单位：Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute; Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
摘要：In this note we provide a strategic implementation of the Average Tree solution for zero-monotonic cycle-free graph games. That is, we propose a non-cooperative mechanism of which the unique subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs correspond to the average hierarchical outcome of the game. This mechanism takes into account that a player is only able to communicate with other players (i.e., to make proposals about a division of the surplus of cooperation) when they are connected in the graph. (C) 2...
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作者：Sattinger, Michael
作者单位：State University of New York (SUNY) System; University at Albany, SUNY
摘要：This paper develops a model of safety first consumption behavior in which the likelihood of survival to the next period depends on current consumption levels. Below a threshold asset level, individuals follow a decumulation path, and above that level they follow an accumulation path. Saving rates then vary discontinuously with asset level, generating a poverty trap and divergence in incomes. An increase in the likelihood of surviving raises aggregate saving. A more equitable distribution of as...
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作者：Mitra, Tapan; Sorger, Gerhard
作者单位：Cornell University; University of Vienna
摘要：Studying a one-sector economy populated by finitely many heterogeneous households that are subject to no-borrowing constraints, we confirm a conjecture by Frank P. Ramsey according to which, in the long run, society would be divided into the set of patient households who own the entire capital stock and impatient ones without any physical wealth. More specifically, we prove (i) that there exists a unique steady state equilibrium that is globally asymptotically stable and (ii) that along every ...
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作者：Oliveros, Santiago
作者单位：University of London; Royal Holloway University London
摘要：We consider an election in which each voter can collect information of different precision. Voters have asymmetric information and preferences that vary both in terms of ideology and intensity. In contrast to all other models of voting with endogenous information, in equilibrium voters collect information of different qualities. We show that information and abstention are not necessarily negatively correlated: some voters are more likely to abstain the more informed they are. We also discuss t...
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作者：Friedman, Daniel; Ostrov, Daniel N.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Santa Cruz; Santa Clara University
摘要：Any absolutely continuous, piecewise smooth, symmetric two-player game can be extended to define a population game in which each player interacts with a large representative subset of the entire population. Assuming that players respond to the payoff gradient over a continuous action space, we obtain nonlinear integro-partial differential equations that are numerically tractable and sometimes analytically tractable. Economic applications include oligopoly, growth theory, and financial bubbles ...
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作者：Ju, Biung-Ghi
作者单位：Seoul National University (SNU)
摘要：We study allocation rules that are robust to coalitional manipulation by transferring, merging, or splitting individual characteristics among coalition partners (e.g. merging or splitting claims in bankruptcy problems). Coalition formation is restricted by an exogenous network (a non-directed graph) so that only connected subsets of agents can form a coalition. We offer a full characterization of non-manipulable rules without any assumption on the network structure. This result yields a variet...
