Noise-independent selection in multidimensional global games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Oury, Marion
• 署名单位: Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2013.04.021
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 2638-2665
• 关键词: Equilibrium selection; global games; strategic complementarities; Robustness

摘要

This paper examines many-player many-action global games with multidimensional state parameters. It establishes that the notion of noise-independent selection introduced by Frankel, Morris and Pauzner [D. Frankel, S. Morris, A. Pauzner, Equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities, J. Econ. Theory 108 (2003) 1-44] for one-dimensional global games is robust when the setting is extended to the one proposed by Carlsson and Van Damme [H. Carlsson, E. Van Damme, Global games and Equilibrium selection, Econometrica 61 (1993) 989-1018]. More precisely, our main result states that if an action profile of some complete information game is noise-independently selected in one-dimensional global games, then it is also noise-independently selected in all multidimensional global games. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.