-
作者：Ortoleva, Pietro
作者单位：California Institute of Technology
摘要：We study the behavior of an agent who dislikes large choice sets because of the 'cost of thinking' involved in choosing from them. Focusing on preferences over lotteries of menus, we introduce the notion of Thinking Aversion. We characterize preferences as the difference between an affine evaluation of the content of the menu and a function that assigns to each menu a thinking cost. We provide conditions for which this cost can be seen as the cost that the agent has to sustain to figure out he...
-
作者：Azariadis, Costas; Chen, Been-Lon; Lu, Chia-Hui; Wang, Yin-Chi
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL); Academia Sinica - Taiwan; National Taipei University; Chinese University of Hong Kong
摘要：This paper considers the impact of leisure preference and leisure externalities on growth and labor supply in a Lucas (1988) [12] type model, as in Gomez (2008) [7], with a separable non-homothetic utility and the assumption that physical and human capital are both necessary inputs in both the goods and the education sectors. In spite of the non-concavities due to the leisure externality, the balanced growth path is always unique, which guarantees global stability for comparative-static exerci...
-
作者：Loewenstein, Mark; Willard, Gregory A.
作者单位：University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park
摘要：We show that an unbounded number of consumption dates is necessary to support an asset pricing bubble. We work in a continuous-time model where the number of trade dates is infinite but the number of consumption dates is flexible and can be chosen to be uniformly bounded, finite almost surely, or infinite. Market clearing, together with monotone preferences for consumption, limits the properties of bubbles and provides restrictions on wealth constraints. In the special case of a uniformly boun...
-
作者：Ollier, Sandrine; Thomas, Lionel
作者单位：Universite Marie et Louis Pasteur
摘要：This paper analyzes optimal contracting when an agent has private information before contracting and exerts bidden effort that stochastically affects the output. Additionally, the contract is constrained to satisfy the agent's ex post participation. We highlight three features of this model. First, the agent faces countervailing incentives. Second, the separation of types is never optimal. Third, the optimal constant bonus rewarding success is distorted downward below its efficient level. (C) ...
-
作者：Armstrong, Mark
作者单位：University of Oxford
摘要：This paper discusses the incentive to bundle when consumer valuations are non-additive and/or when products are supplied by separate sellers. Whether integrated or separate, a firm has an incentive to introduce a bundle discount when demand for the bundle is more elastic than the overall demand for products. When separate sellers coordinate on a bundle discount, they can use the discount to relax competition, which can harm welfare. (C) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
-
作者：Decker, Colin; Lieb, Elliott H.; McCann, Robert J.; Stephens, Benjamin K.
作者单位：University of Toronto; Princeton University
摘要：Choo and Siow (2006) [7] proposed a model for the marriage market which allows for random identically distributed McFadden-type noise in the preferences of each of the participants. In this note we exhibit a strictly convex function whose derivatives vanish precisely at the equilibria of their model. This implies uniqueness of the resulting equilibrium marriage distribution, simplifies the argument for its existence, and gives a representation of it in closed form. We go on to derive smooth de...
-
作者：Hsiaw, Alice
作者单位：College of the Holy Cross
摘要：This paper addresses the role of non-binding goals to attenuate time inconsistency. Present-biased agents have linear reference-dependent preferences and endogenously set a goal that is the reference point. They face an infinite horizon, optimal stopping problem in continuous time. When there is sufficient commitment to expectation-based goals, goal-setting attenuates the present-biased agent's tendency to stop too early, and may even lead an agent to wait longer than the first-best. In partic...
-
作者：Challe, Edouard; Le Grand, Francois; Ragot, Xavier
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique; emlyon business school; Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich
摘要：We analyse the term structure of interest rates in a general equilibrium model with incomplete markets, borrowing constraint, and positive net supply of government bonds. Uninsured idiosyncratic shocks generate bond trades, while aggregate shocks cause fluctuations in the trading price of bonds. Long bonds command a liquidation risk premium over short bonds, because they may have to be liquidated before maturity following a bad idiosyncratic shock precisely when their resale value is low due t...
-
作者：Dana, Rose-Anne; Riedel, Frank
作者单位：Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine; University of Bielefeld
摘要：We study a dynamic and infinite-dimensional model with incomplete multiple prior preferences. In interior efficient allocations, agents share a common risk-adjusted prior and subjective interest rate. Interior efficient allocations and equilibria coincide with those of economies with subjective expected utility and priors from the agents' multiple prior sets. A specific model with neither risk nor uncertainty at the aggregate level is considered. Risk is always fully insured. For small levels ...
-
作者：Chatterji, Shurojit; Sanver, Remzi; Sen, Arunava
作者单位：Singapore Management University; Istanbul Bilgi University; Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi
摘要：In this paper, we investigate domains that admit well-behaved strategy-proof social choice functions. We show that if the number of voters is even, then every domain that satisfies a richness condition and admits an anonymous, tops-only, unanimous and strategy-proof social choice function, must be semi-single-peaked. Conversely every semi-single-peaked domain admits an anonymous, tops-only, unanimous and strategy-proof social choice function. Semi-single-peaked domains are generalizations of s...
