Efficient and optimal mechanisms with private information acquisition costs

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Lu, Jingfeng; Ye, Lixin
• 署名单位: National University of Singapore; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2012.12.009
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 393-408
• 关键词: mechanisms; auctions; Two-stage auctions; information acquisition; entry

摘要

In auctions with private information acquisition costs, we completely characterize (socially) efficient and (revenue) optimal two-stage mechanisms, with the first stage being an entry right allocation mechanism and the second stage being a traditional private good provision mechanism. Both efficiency and revenue optimality require that the second-stage selling mechanism be ex post efficient and the number of entry slots be endogenously determined. We show that both efficient and optimal entry can be truthfully implemented in dominant strategies, and can also be implemented via all-pay, though not uniform-price or discriminatory-price, auctions. (C) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.