Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Eraslan, Huelya; McLennan, Andrew
• 署名单位: Johns Hopkins University; University of Queensland
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2013.09.007
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 2195-2222
• 关键词: Noncooperative bargaining; Multilateral bargaining; TU games; simple games; coalitions; Legislative bargaining; Fixed points; Fixed point index

摘要

We study a model of sequential bargaining in which, in each period before an agreement is reached, the proposer's identity is randomly determined, the proposer suggests a division of a pie of size one, each other agent either approves or rejects the proposal, and the proposal is implemented if the set of approving agents is a winning coalition for the proposer. The theory of the fixed point index is used to show that stationary equilibrium expected payoffs of this coalitional bargaining game are unique. This generalizes Eraslan [34] insofar as: (a) there are no restrictions on the structure of sets of winning coalitions; (b) different proposers may have different sets of winning coalitions; (c) there may be a positive probability that no proposer is selected. (C) 2013 Published by Elsevier Inc.