Characterising equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Basteck, Christian; Daniels, Tijmen R.; Heinemann, Frank
• 署名单位: Technical University of Berlin
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2013.07.006
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 2620-2637
• 关键词: Global games; equilibrium selection; strategic complementarities

摘要

Global games are widely used to predict behaviour in games with strategic complementarities and multiple equilibria. We establish two results on the global game selection. First, we show that, for any supermodular complete information game, the global game selection is independent of the payoff functions chosen for the game's global game embedding. Second, we give a simple sufficient criterion to derive the selection and establish noise independence in many-action games by decomposing them into games with smaller action sets, to which we may often apply simple criteria. We also report in which small games noise independence may be established by counting the number of players or actions. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.